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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMICS WITH FINANCIAL FRICTIONS

Eugenio Rojas
Enrique G. Mendoza

This dissertation consists of two chapters on macroeconomics with financial frictions.
The first chapter studies the role of firm heterogeneity in the transmission of financial
shocks to the real economy. Evidence from the recent European debt crisis shows that
firms responded differently to the severe credit tightening that occurred during this period,
where smaller ones adjusted their balance sheets more aggressively and performed better in
economies with a more skewed firm size distribution. A model of heterogeneous firms, that
face financial frictions (defaultable debt and costly equity issuance), a financial intermediation sector, and a sovereign, is proposed to explain these facts. Financial frictions are key
because they generate financing structures that depend on firm size, where small firms rely
more on equity than debt, which is relatively more costly. Sufficiently large increases in
public debt trigger a binding lending constraint for the intermediaries that cause a crowding
out of private lending and leads smaller firms to adjust more than large firms. Quantitative
results show that firm heterogeneity has aggregate effects and that the model, calibrated to
match Spanish firm-level data, is consistent with the empirical facts during the crisis. The
second chapter studies the positive and normative implications of “liability dollarization”,
the intermediation of capital inflows in units of tradables into domestic loans in units of ag-
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gregate consumption, on Sudden Stops models. Liability dollarization adds three important
effects driven by real-exchange-rate fluctuations that alter standard models of Sudden Stops
significantly: Changes on the debt repayment burden, on the price of new debt, and on a
risk-taking incentive. The optimal policy under commitment is time-inconsistent, follows a
complex non-linear structure, and shows that when domestic credit or capital inflows taxes
are present, capital controls are not justified. Quantitatively, an optimized pair of constant
taxes on domestic debt and capital inflows makes crises slightly less likely and yields a
small welfare gain, but other pairs reduce welfare sharply. For high effective debt taxes,
capital controls and domestic debt taxes are equivalent, and for low ones welfare is higher
with higher taxes on domestic debt than on capital inflows.

vii

Contents

Acknowledgements

v

Abstract

vii

1 Firm Heterogeneity & the Transmission of Financial Shocks During the European Debt Crisis

1

1.1

Firm Heterogeneity & the European Debt Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.2

The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1.3

1.2.1

Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1.2.2

Financial Intermediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1.2.3

Sovereign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1.2.4

Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1.2.5

Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1.2.6

Understanding the Mechanism of the Model: A 2-Period Case . . . 22

Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3.1

Model Solution & Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

1.3.2

Aggregate and Firm-Level Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii

1.4

1.3.3

The Relevance of Firm Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

1.3.4

The Role of Financial Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

2 Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops
48

Models of Macroprudential Policy
2.1

2.2

2.3

Model Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.1.1

Private agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2.1.2

Financial Intermediation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Competitive Equilibrium & Comparison with Standard Models . . . . . . . 57
2.2.1

Comparison with Standard SS Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

2.2.2

Perfect Foresight Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

2.2.3

Quantitative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Normative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.3.1

Optimal Policy under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

2.3.2

Quantitative Evaluation of Simple Rules for Debt Taxes & Capital
Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

2.4

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Appendices

103

A Appendix to Firm Heterogeneity & the Transmission of Financial Shocks During the European Debt Crisis

104

A.1 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

ix

A.1.1 Additional Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.2 Computational Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.2.1 Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.2.2 Construction of Impulse Response Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B Appendix to Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for
Sudden Stops Models of Macroprudential Policy

112

B.1 Properties of the BBSSLD Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

x

List of Tables

Firm Heterogeneity & the Transmission of Financial Shocks During the European
Debt Crisis

1

1.1

Panel Regression Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

1.2

Implied Semi-elasticities for Debt Increases (Percentages) . . . . . . . . . 10

1.3

Panel Regression Results, Financing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

1.4

Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

1.5

Targeted and Non-targeted Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops
Models of Macroprudential Policy

48

2.1

Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

2.2

Effectiveness of Constant Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

xi

List of Figures

Firm Heterogeneity & the Transmission of Financial Shocks During the European
1

Debt Crisis
1.1

Policy Function Heat maps - Increase in Financing Costs . . . . . . . . . . 33

1.2

Impulse Response Functions - Aggregates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

1.3

Event Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

1.4

Impulse Response Functions - Firm-Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

1.5

Impulse Response Function of Output - No Equity Issuance . . . . . . . . . 39

1.6

Impulse Response Functions - Heterogeneity v. No Heterogeneity . . . . . 42

1.7

Impulse Response Functions - Low v. High Skewness . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

1.8

Impulse Response Functions - No Equity Issuance Cost . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Positive and Normative Implications of Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops
48

Models of Macroprudential Policy
2.1

Sudden Stops under Perfect Foresight: Unique Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . 64

2.2

Multiple Equilibria under Perfect Foresight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

2.3

Sudden Stops in Response to Income Shocks in the SSLD Model . . . . . . 74
xii

2.4

Sudden Stops in Response to Changes in κ in the SS and SSLD Models . . 75

2.5

Multiple Equilibria in the SS and SSLD Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

2.6

Welfare Effects of Constant Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

2.7

Sudden Stop Events: Unregulated Economy v. Economy with Constant Taxes 99

xiii

Chapter 1
Firm Heterogeneity & the Transmission
of Financial Shocks During the
European Debt Crisis
This paper studies the role of firm heterogeneity in the transmission of financial shocks
and its macroeconomic implications. The analysis focuses on a particular event, namely
the severe tightening in credit conditions for firms during the recent European debt crisis.
This event was a natural experiment that provided abundant firm-level data on the effects
of a sharp, sudden deterioration of credit-market conditions on non-financial firms in the
countries most affected by the crisis: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIIPS).
Existing studies have shown that an important channel explaining the deterioration of the
financing conditions of firms during this event was the “crowding-out” channel, as documented by Broner et al. (2014) and more recently by Acharya et al. (2018) and Becker
and Ivashina (2018). Increased government borrowing and bank holdings of public debt
in these countries generated a crowding-out of private lending, reducing loanable funds
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available to firms and increasing their financing costs.1
The first part of this paper uses the Amadeus database to conduct an empirical analysis
of the effects of the financial shock described above on non-financial firms in the GIIPS
countries. The empirical analysis yields two important new findings regarding the relevance
of firm heterogeneity in the responses of firms to the observed surge in sovereign debt: First,
smaller firms adjusted their sales, liabilities, assets, and employment more than large firms.
Second, smaller firms experienced smaller adjustments in these variables in countries with
more skewed firm size distributions. The data also show that financing costs, measured as
the ratio of debt service to total debt, increased more for smaller firms.
The second part of the paper proposes a model to explain the above facts and derives
its quantitative implications. The model has three main components. First, a heterogeneous firms sector. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, capital, and debt,
and face financial frictions in the form of defaultable debt and costly equity issuance, modeled as imperfect substitutes. These features endogenously generate a time-varying firm
distribution. The second component is a financial intermediation sector. A representative
financial intermediary lends to firms and the government, facing an occasionally binding
constraint on loanable funds. The last element is the government. For simplicity, aggregate
fiscal shocks and a fiscal reaction function drive public debt dynamics. The firms’ financial
frictions generate different financing structures, with small firms relying relatively more
on equity than large firms, where size is defined by a firm’s capital stock. The asymmetry in the responses between small and large firms arises from the fact that the former are
more financially constrained, so they need to issue equity more often, and thus face a more
expensive financing mix.
1. Another channel through which the government affected the financing conditions of firms during this
episode is the pass-through of sovereign risk, as studied by Gennaioli et al. (2014a), Gennaioli et al.
(2014b), Bottero et al. (2015), Sosa-Padilla (2015), Bocola (2016). According to this channel, increased
sovereign risk negatively affected the balance sheet of intermediaries, who held sovereign bonds, generating a worsening in the financing conditions of firms.

2

When public debt is sufficiently high, the bank’s constraint binds, so the amount of
resources available for firm lending falls (i.e., there is a crowding-out effect), increasing
firms’ borrowing costs. Since firms have different financing structures depending on their
size, due to financial frictions, they respond differently. Because equity issuance is increasingly costly, small firms switching (partially or entirely) from debt to equity financing
adjust more aggressively than larger firms that rely relatively more on debt or internal resources. This is because issuing even more equity comes at an increasing cost, pushing
small firms closer to the default cutoff, so they have to adjust more their investment and
output. The size-dependent responses to the financial shock imply that economies with different firm size distributions should adjust differently. Economies with a higher fraction of
small firms (i.e., less skewed firm size distributions) adjust more because small firms adjust
more aggressively when financing costs increase.
Interestingly, in this model firm heterogeneity has aggregate implications. The severity
of financial frictions and the magnitude of the financial shock affect the evolution of the
distribution of firms, and hence the dynamics of aggregate outcomes such as output. In
particular, the model predicts a larger fall in aggregate output when the firm size distribution
is less skewed. We observe a similar pattern if we compare Portugal v. Spain. During the
crisis, Portuguese output declined more and took longer to recover than the Spanish case.
Portugal also has a firm size distribution that is significantly less skewed than Spain’s.
The model is calibrated to match firm-level features of Spain. For an increase in
sovereign debt consistent with the Spanish case, the model predicts that small firms adjust more than large ones, and that smaller firms would reduce less their debt and capital
stocks if the economy had a larger firm-size dispersion. Regarding the aggregate effects
of firm heterogeneity, the model predicts an output drop of roughly half the size of the decline observed in Spain during the European debt crisis. Comparing with the results for the
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same model setup but with a representative firm, output drops by 2 percentage points more
(with respect to its long-run average), in the economy with heterogeneous firms. Hence, in
the presence of financial frictions, firm heterogeneity amplifies the responses of aggregate
variables to a tightening in credit conditions significantly.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First, it documents the two new facts
mentioned earlier using a rich European firm-level dataset, namely that during the European
debt crisis small and large firms adjusted differently upon the same financial shock (where
the latter adjust less aggressively), and that small firms in countries with more skewed firm
size distributions adjusted less during this episode. Empirical findings related to the facts
mentioned, such as the ones of Bottero et al. (2015), which uses Italian firm-bank credit
relation data, show that small firms adjusted more their investment than large ones. In
the same context, Arellano et al. (2017) finds that increases in Italian sovereign spreads
decrease more sharply the sales growth of small firms. This paper provides evidence on
more balance sheet variables for the set of countries that were most affected during this
episode and also studies the role of the skewness of the distribution of firms.
Second, it contributes to the literature on heterogeneous agents in production with aggregate uncertainty. In the model, financial frictions make firms’ responses to be non linearly scalable in size, and as a result firm heterogeneity has aggregate implications. This
is a key departure from classic approaches, particularly Bernanke et al. (1999), in which
the distribution of wealth is irrelevant. The model combines different features of the investment financing literature, such as costly equity issuance (Gomes, 2001, Cooley and
Quadrini, 2001) and defaultable debt (Hennessy and Whited, 2007), and extends its traditional framework by including aggregate uncertainty via a government and financial intermediation sector. This paper is closer to the work of Khan and Thomas (2013) and Khan
et al. (2014), which studies aggregate fluctuations generated by credit shocks in the con-
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text of firm heterogeneity, and it differs in two dimensions. The first one is that this paper
explicitly models the financial intermediation sector, where the size of the financial shock
is a function of the distribution of firms. The second difference is that the model allows for
(costly) equity issuance. The imperfect substitutability between equity and debt is a key
feature of the model and produces size-dependent responses to financial shocks that are
consistent with the ones observed during the European debt crisis. In this line, Gilchrist
et al. (2014) proposes a setting with heterogeneous firms facing similar financial frictions
(but abstracting from financial shocks) to analyze the implications of uncertainty shocks on
investment dynamics. In more recent work, Ottonello and Winberry (2018) studies the role
of monetary policy shocks in a framework with heterogeneous firms and financial frictions,
but not allowing for equity issuance and aggregate uncertainty.
The third contribution is related to the literature on the transmission of sovereign debt
crises to the real economy. This paper focuses on studying the crowding-out effect that
sovereign debt has on the availability of funds for non-financial firms. It shows that firm
heterogeneity along with financial frictions are key to generate an amplification effect, by
which a tightening of private financial conditions in response to a sovereign debt crisis has
large adverse effects on aggregate output. Empirical work, such as Acharya et al. (2018)
and Becker and Ivashina (2018), shows that during the crisis government debt crowdedout private credit and investment. In this regard, Broner et al. (2014) provides a theoretical framework to explain the crowing-out channel, where credit discrimination is the key
driver. This paper contributes to this strand of the literature by assessing the role of firm
heterogeneity on the crowing-out channel.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 provides the empirical analysis of the
role of heterogeneity across firms in the effects of the financial shock triggered by the
European debt crisis. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section 1.3 presents the calibration
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and assessment of the model’s equilibrium outcomes, as well as the quantitative results
regarding the transmission of financial shocks and the role of firm heterogeneity. Section
1.4 concludes.

1.1

Firm Heterogeneity & the European Debt Crisis

This section presents an empirical analysis of the effects associated on non-financial firms
caused by the sharp increase in sovereign borrowing during the European debt crisis. Increased sovereign borrowing generated a crowding-out effect on firm lending, which affected the financing conditions of non-financial firms in the involved economies. This
section focuses on analyzing the effects of this financial shocks at the firm level using the
Amadeus database.2 This database contains roughly 21 million firms across Europe. Firms
of all sizes are required to report information about their balance sheets, so that the sample
that is possible to access is more representative of the whole economy than other popular
datasets, such as Compustat (which only contains publicly listed firms).
In order to study the responses at the firm level to the sovereign debt surge, which is an
aggregate shock, a panel dataset is constructed. Firms in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and
Spain are considered, as these countries were the most affected during the debt crisis. The
analysis focuses on the time period of 2010 to 2014, in order to avoid the Great Recession.3
The estimated specification is given by the following equation:
5

5

k=2

k=2

xi, j,t = β B j,t + ∑ δk Qi, j,t,k B j,t + ∑ φk Qi, j,t,k B j,t Sk j,t + κ B j,t Sk j,t + z′i, j,t γ + αi, j + ηi, j,t
(1.1)
2. The database was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). A brief description of
how variables were treated and generated is presented in the Appendix.
3. Unfortunately, the speed at which the Amadeus database is updated does not allow to include 2015 at the
moment this paper is written. Years 2015 and 2016 are not well populated in terms of observations, so
they are omitted from the analysis.
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where xi, j,t denotes the outcome x for firm i in country j at period t, B j,t corresponds to
the gross public debt-to-output ratio for country j at period t, Qk is a size dummy that is
equal to 1 if the firm belong to the kth quintile of firm size , Sk j,t represents the skewness
of the firm size distribution in country j at period t, z is a vector of controls, α is a firm
fixed effect, and η is the error term.4 The outcome variables studied are the logs of sales,
total assets, total liabilities and employment, at the firm level.5
This specification allows us to capture the semi-elasticity of the dependent variable
(measured in log) with respect to increases in government debt, but allowing for differential effects in terms of firm size and skewness of the country’s firm size distribution. For
example, δk reflects the differential effect that increases in debt have on firms of different
size, while φk captures a similar effect but considering different levels of skewness of the
firm size distribution.6
The regression equation is estimated using fixed effects at the firm level.7 The estimation results are presented in Table 1.1. The results show that increases in sovereign debt
decrease firms’ sales, liabilities, assets, and employment. Also, larger firms perform better than small firms when sovereign debt increases, as it can be seen from the coefficient
associated with the interaction B × Qk . However, when considering the triple interaction
between debt, firm size and skewness of the firm size distribution, we see that the large
firms do not perform better than small ones in economies where skewness is larger. This is
4. Control variables include a set of lagged versions of all outcome variables, as well as firm size quintile
dummies, and year dummies.
5. We also performed robustness checks regarding the addition of more controls, in order assess whether
it is indeed government debt the variable affecting the firm-level outcomes. In particular, we include
1-year sovereign CDS spreads and also an estimation of the fraction of general government debt held by
domestic banks, for each country. For the latter we follow the methodology presented in Arslanalp and
Tsuda (2014). The estimation results do not change significantly.
ln y
.
6. The semi-elasticity of variable y with respect to variable x is given by ςy,x = ddx
7. An alternative version is estimated using random effects and adding controls for industry and country.
The results do not change significantly, but the Hausman test strongly rejects the usage of a random effects
specification. Another possibility is to use a pooled OLS specification. We present in the Appendix the
comparison between the fixed effects, random effects, and pooled OLS specifications.
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the case for all variables except for employment, where the greater the skewness the better
the larger firms perform in relation to small ones.
The magnitude of the coefficients is relatively small, but their statistical significance is
quite high, as suggested by their p-values. To make the analysis simpler, Table 1.2 presents
the implied semi-elasticities in response to an increase of one percentage point in the ratio
of gross public debt-to-output. At the average sample skewness, an increase in sovereign
debt decreases the sales of small firms by 0.27%, while for large firms the decrease is
smaller, 0.12%.8 These decreases might seem small, but it is important to note that the
average increase in government debt in 2012 was large. For example, in the case of Spain,
in 2012 the debt-to-output ratio increased by roughly 16 percentage points. Thus, for this
case, the semi-elasticity results predict that sales decreased by 4.4% for small firms, and
1.9% for large ones, a large drop in both cases. We continue to observe an asymmetry in the
adjustments of small and large firms, where the former adjust more than the latter, except
for the case of liabilities.
The estimated coefficients can be used to compare the responses to increases in the
sovereign debt-to-output ratio between small and large firms across countries with different
levels of skewness of the firm size distribution. Varying the level of skewness allows us to
analyze whether these responses are different between countries. This exercise considers
the contrast between the semi-elasticities to increases in public debt-to-output for Portugal
(low skewness) and Spain (high skewness). The second and third rows of Table 1.2 presents
the results. We see that (i) small Portuguese and Spanish firms adjust more than large firms
in terms of sales, liabilities, assets, and employment, and that (ii) Portuguese firms (small
and large) adjust more than Spanish firms for the same set of variables. The first result
is consistent with the pattern found for the entire sample, namely that small firms adjust
more than large ones. The second one reveals the role of the skewness of the firm size
8. Coefficients with a p-value above 0.10 are set to 0 when calculating the semi-elasticities.
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distribution. Firms in countries with a lower skewness adjust more to an increase in the
sovereign debt-to-output ratio.

Table 1.1: Panel Regression Results
Variable
B
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
B × Q2
B × Q3
B × Q4
B × Q5
B × Q2 × Skewness
B × Q3 × Skewness
B × Q4 × Skewness
B × Q5 × Skewness
B × Skewness
Year Effects
Fixed Effects
Controls
Observations
R2

Log(Sales)
-0.003
(0.000)
0.327
(0.000)
0.562
(0.000)
0.754
(0.000)
0.864
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0
(0.000)
0
(0.036)
0.002
(0.000)
0.000
(0.058)
-0.000
(0.727)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,195,072
0.58

Log(Liabilities)
-0.003
(0.000)
0.718
(0.000)
1.250
(0.000)
1.712
(0.000)
2.103
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.054)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,308,816
0.736

Log(Assets)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.519
(0.000)
0.909
(0.000)
1.237
(0.000)
1.532
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.474)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,313,051
0.911

Log(Employment)
-0.003
(0.000)
0.161
(0.000)
0.285
(0.000)
0.368
(0.000)
0.424
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.367)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.013)
0.000
(0.934)
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,119,977
0.585

Notes: B denotes the gross public debt-to-output ratio, Qk is a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 if the firm belongs to the kth quintile of firm size, and Sk is the skewness of the firm size
distribution. Countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Clustered standard
errors at the firm level considered, p-values in parentheses.
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The analysis presented above shows two important new findings regarding the relevance
of firm heterogeneity and firm size distribution. First, during the debt crisis, small firms
adjusted more than large firms. Second, small firms in economies where the skewness
of the firm size distribution adjusted less than their counterparts in economies with lower
skewness.
Table 1.2: Implied Semi-elasticities for Debt Increases (Percentages)

Average Skewness
Portuguese Skewness
Spanish Skewness

Sales
Small
-0.269
-0.319
-0.300

Large
-0.115
-0.150
-0.136

Liabilities
Small Large
-0.273 -0.277
-0.309 -0.294
-0.295 -0.288

Assets
Small
-0.131
-0.175
-0.158

Large
0.016
-0.017
-0.005

Employment
Small Large
-0.267 -0.263
-0.267 -0.266
-0.267 -0.265

Notes: Small firms are those that belong to the first quintile of firm size, and large firms correspond to
those that belong to the fifth quintile.

The last exercise of this section seeks to assess whether increases in sovereign debt
indeed increased the financing cost of firms. Unfortunately, the Amadeus database does
not contain information about contractual interest rates paid by firms. It is possible to
construct a proxy for the average effective interest rate paid by the firm. In particular, we
Interest Paid
can compute ri,t = Liabilities i,t , which proxies for the average interest rate paid by firms.
i,t
Unfortunately, the database does not allow us to identify the maturity of the debt.
In order to assess if the financing costs respond to increases in sovereign debt, the
following specification is estimated:
5

5

k=2

k=2

ri, j,t = β B j,t + ∑ δk Qi, j,t,k B j,t + ∑ φk Qi, j,t,k B j,t Sk j,t + κ B j,t Sk j,t + z′i, j,t γ + αi, j + ηi, j,t
(1.2)
where the set of independent variables is defined in the same way as in the previous regression equation. Table 1.3 presents the estimation results.
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Table 1.3: Panel Regression Results, Financing Costs
Variable
B
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
B × Q2
B × Q3
B × Q4
B × Q5
B × Q2 × Skewness
B × Q3 × Skewness
B × Q4 × Skewness
B × Q5 × Skewness
B × Skewness
Year Effects
Fixed Effects
Controls
Observations
R2

ri × 100
0.000
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.000)
-0.017
(0.000)
-0.022
(0.000)
-0.027
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.222)
-0.027
(0.599)
-0.03
(0.972)
-0.043
(0.637)
0.000
(0.007)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2,852,913
0.001

Notes: B denotes the gross public debt-to-output ratio, Qk is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm
belongs to the kth quintile of firm size, and Sk is the skewness of the firm size distribution. Countries include
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Clustered standard errors at the firm level considered, p-values in
parentheses.

The magnitudes of the coefficients are quite small, although they are statistically significant. To make the exposition clearer, average responses are also computed. The implied
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increase in the average interest rate for a small firm in response to a 1-percentage-point
increase in the public debt-to-output ratio is of 2 basis points, while for large firms it is
0.9 basis points. For the case of Spain in 2012, the increase (roughly 16 percentage in the
debt to output ratio) meant an increase of 32 and 14 basis points for small and large firms,
respectively. Although the magnitude is not large, the effects are statistically significant,
which reflects the fact that part of the increase in financing costs of firms is being captured
in this analysis.

1.2

The Model

The model consists of 4 main components. First, is a heterogeneous firm sector, where
firms differ in their debt (b) and capital stocks (k), and idiosyncratic productivity (z). Firms
face financial frictions (defaultable debt and costly equity issuance) which affects how they
finance their investment, leading to non-trivial financing structures which are firm-size dependent (where size is defined by the firm’s capital). The time-varying distribution of firms
is denoted by Γ. Second, a financial intermediation sector lends to the sovereign and firms.
Financial intermediaries live 2 periods and are born with wealth Ā. The limited wealth
generates an occasionally binding constraint, that is triggered when government debt is
sufficiently high. In case the constraint binds, the price at which the government (qg )
and firms (q) can borrow decreases, which is a financing cost shock for firms. Sovereign
borrowing crowds-out private borrowing. Third, the sovereign. Sovereign debt (B) dynamics evolve according to a fiscal reaction function and to the realization of aggregate fiscal
shocks (ε ). The state variables for the sovereign are its outstanding debt and the fiscal shock
(S = (B, ε )), which will also happen to be the aggregate states of the economy. Lastly, a
risk-neutral household sector that own firms and receive transfers T from the government.
The timeline of the events of the model between periods t and t+ is as follows. At the
12

beginning of the period, the aggregate shock is realized. The sovereign borrows according
to its fiscal reaction function, outstanding debt and realization of the shock. Firm productivity for the period is materialized, and the firm decides whether to default on its debt or
not. In case of default, the firm exits forever and is replaced by a new one. If it decides to
continue operating, it chooses its investment and how to finance it (debt, equity issuance, or
internal resources) for the next period. The price at which the sovereign and firms borrow
is determined jointly with the problem of the representative financial intermediary.

1.2.1 Firms
Firms accumulate capital, k, through investment, which can be financed by (i) internal
resources of the firm, (ii) debt (b) and (iii) equity issuance. Firms face two kinds of financial
frictions, defaultable debt and costly equity issuance. This setting is similar to the one of
Hennessy and Whited (2007), which builds on Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited
(2005).9 Firm debt is risky, because can be defaulted on. The price at which firms borrow,
q, depends on their observable state variables and on the aggregate states of the economy
(which will be specified below). Equity issuance, on the other hand, is costly, reflecting
that the firm incurs in costs when trying to raise resources by selling equity. This is a
fairly common assumption in the corporate finance literature (Gomes, 2001; Cooley and
Quadrini, 2001; Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012), and allows for
the existence of a trade-off between different sources of external financing.
The production technology of a firm is given by f (z, k) = zkα (with α < 1), where
z denotes its productivity. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks to their productivity,
which follow a finite state Markov process characterized by the CDF G(z′ |z). The law of
9. These articles provide a partial equilibrium setting featuring heterogeneous firms. Hennessy and Whited
(2007) considers firms that differ in their productivity, debt, and capital, that can default on their debt and
face equity issuance costs.
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motion for capital is given by k′ = k(1 − δ ) + i, where i denotes investment and δ is the
rate at which capital depreciates. There is an investment adjustment cost that the firm must
 ′
2
pay, which is given by Ψ(k′ , k) = ψ2 kk − 1 k. Firms are subject to a proportional tax τ
on profits, and incur a fixed cost F to operate.
Before production begins each period, firms decide whether to default on their debt or
not. If they do, they exit the economy forever and are replaced by a firm with no debt,
a level of capital k, and productivity drawn from the long-run probability distribution of
the Markov process specified above (G∗ (z)).10 Additionally, in case of default, nothing is
recovered by the firm, but creditors recover a fraction θ of the firm’s undepreciated capital.
Firms obtain a continuation value V in case they decide not to default.
In order to finance investment, firms can rely on internal or external financing. Internal
resources consist of all the resources the firm has available after producing and paying for
the operational costs and outstanding debt. External financing consists of debt issuance
and/or equity issuance. The price at which a firm can borrow depends on its productivity z,
capital for the next period k′ , and borrowed amount b′ . This is because the price responds
to the expected future default probability of the firm, which is a function of how much it
borrowed and invested today, and of its expected future productivity.11 Hence, if borrowing
is too high then the likelihood of future default might increase, and this will be reflected
in the price of debt. The equilibrium price is determined by the interaction between the
government, firms, and financial intermediaries, and is also influenced by aggregate states
S and the distribution of firms Γ. Denote the equilibrium price faced by a firm with the
above characteristics by q(z, k′, b′ ; S, Γ). If firms decide to issue equity they incur a cost
Λ(e) = λ e2 , where e denotes the amount of equity being issued. The functional form
assumed is similar to the one used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and Covas and den
10. This assumption keeps the mass of firms in the economy constant.
11. Given that productivity follows a Markov process its realization today gives information about future
realizations.
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Hann (2012), and rationalizes the fact that there are increasing marginal costs associated
to issuing equity, such as underwriter fees, as shown by Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and
Altinkilic and Hansen (2000).
The problem of a firm that does not default is given by:
V (z, k, b; S, Γ) =

max



{(k′ ,b′ )∈ϒ(z;S,Γ)}

e + β Ez′ ,S′ |z,S max{V (z , k , b ; S , Γ ), 0}
′

′

′

′

′



(1.3)

s.t.
e = (1 − τ )(zkα − F) − k′ + k(1 − δ ) − Ψ(k′ , k) + q(z, k′, b′ ; S, Γ)b′ − b − Φ Λ(e)
Γ′ = Ω(S, Γ)
where e denotes the cash flow to shareholders, Φ denotes an indicator variable that is equal
to 1 when e < 0 (when there is equity issuance) and 0 otherwise, and Ω corresponds to the
law of motion for the distribution of firms. Finally, firms choose their capital for next period
and debt from sets K and B, respectively, which are compact sets. As in Gomes (2001),
K is compact because it is a closed and bounded set. It is bounded from below by 0 and
bounded above by a level k̃, which is the largest possible capital stock that is profitable for
the firm and solves α zk̃α −1 − δ = 0. Thus, we can define K = [0, k̃]. Regarding the choice
set for debt, given a price schedule q(z, k′, b′ ; S, Γ), debt will be bounded below by 0 (firms
cannot save via debt) and above by an endogenous level b̃(z, k′ ; S, Γ) that represents the
maximum debt a firm can take, which will be a function of productivity and capital choice
(and aggregate states) and such that q(z, k′, b̃(z, k′; S, Γ); S, Γ) = 0. Hence, we can define
B in a similar way as K . The choice correspondence ϒ(z; S, Γ) is defined as ϒ(z; S, Γ) ≡
{(k′ , b′ ) : k′ ∈ K , b′ ∈ [0, b̃(z, k′ ; S, Γ)]}. Note that this correspondence is convex, compact
valued and continuous.
Notice that from the expression for the value function of the firm we can see that a
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threshold rule for productivity will apply. Let z(k, b; S, Γ) be defined as:
V (z(k, b; S, Γ), k, b; S, Γ) = 0

(1.4)

z(k, b; S, Γ) defines the cutoff value of productivity for which the firm will decide to default
˜ k, b; S, Γ) as a binary variable that
on its obligations. It follows that we can define d(z,
takes the value of 1 if the firm defaults today conditional on debt contracted in the previous
period, and 0 otherwise:

˜ k, b; S, Γ) =
d(z,




1 if



0 if

z < z(k, b; S, Γ)
z > z(k, b; S, Γ)

˜ k, b; S, Γ) we can define the probability that a firm defaults
Using the decision rule d(z,
in the future. Given The default probability tomorrow for a firm with productivity z that
chooses capital k′ and borrows b′ today is given by:
 ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ 

˜ , k , b ; S , Γ ) = Pr z′ < z(k′ , b′ ; S′ , Γ′ )|z
p̃(z, k′, b′ ; S, Γ) = Ez′ |z d(z

(1.5)

1.2.2 Financial Intermediation
Risk-neutral intermediaries that live for 2 periods are born with a level of wealth Ā, and
have to decide how much to lend to the sovereign and firms.12 The fact that intermediaries
live for 2 periods, as in Aguiar et al. (2016) and Coimbra and Rey (2017), simplifies the
setting because there is no need to keep track of the evolution of their level of wealth, while
maintaining the key idea of the crowding-out between sovereign and firm lending.
If a firm defaults, the intermediaries recover a fraction θ of the undepreciated capital
12. Intermediaries are identical and there is a mass 1 of them.
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((1 − δ )k). In case of sovereign default, they recover nothing. Intermediaries face a limited
liability constraint (i.e. dividends cannot be negative) in both periods, and loanable funds
constraint in the first period, where dividends plus funds lent cannot exceed Ā. The problem
of the representative financial intermediary is given by:

max

{x,x′ ,B′ ,{b′ (z,k,b)}}

x + β̃ ES′ ,z′ |S,z[x′ ]

(1.6)

s.t.
x + qg B′ (S) +
′

′

Z

q(z, k′(z, k, b), b′(z, k, b))b′(z, k, b)dΓ(z, k, b) ≤ Ā
g

x = B (S)(1 − d (B(S)) +

Z

[b′ (z, k, b)(1 − d˜2(z, k′(z, k, b), b′(z, k, b)))

˜ k′ (z, k, b), b′(z, k, b))θ k′(z, k, b)(1 − δ )]dΓ(z, k, b)
+ d(z,
x, x′ ≥ 0
where x and x′ denote the dividends of the first and second period, respectively, b′ (z, k, b)
denote the amount lent and to a firm with characteristics (z, k, b), k′ (z, k, b) is the choice of
capital for next period of a firm with the same characteristics, and B′ denotes the size of
loan going to the sovereign. The discount factor of the representative intermediary is given
by β̃ .
The loanable funds constraint occasionally binds because the sum of sovereign borrowing and aggregate firm borrowing is not necessarily equal the level of wealth Ā: if it is less,
the constraint does not bind, while if it is equal to the level of wealth the constraint binds.
The time-varying nature of public and aggregate private debt generates periods where the
constraint may or may not bind.
The first order conditions of the intermediary’s problem give the pricing functions for
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sovereign and firm debt, as well as a slackness condition:
E[(1 − d g(B′ (S)))]
1 − pg (B′ (S))
= β̃
(1.7)
1 + µ (S, Γ)
1 + µ (S, Γ)
˜ k′ , b′ )(1 − θ (1 − δ )k′ )]
E[1 − d(z,
1 − p̃(z, k′ , b′ )(1 − θ (1 − δ )k′ )
= β̃
q(z, k′ , b′ ; S, Γ) = β̃
1 + µ (S, Γ)
1 + µ (S, Γ)

qg (B′ ; S, Γ) = β̃

(1.8)


Z
Ā − qg (B′ ; S, Γ)B′ (S) − q(z, k′ (z, k, b), b′(z, k, b); S, Γ)b′ (z, k, b)dΓ(z, k, b) µ (S, Γ) = 0
(1.9)
where µ (·) represents the Lagrange multiplier of the loanable funds constraint of period 1,
d g (B′ ) is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the sovereign defaults, and 0 otherwise, and
pg (B′ ) is the probability the sovereign defaults in the next period, given a loan B′ .13 µ depends on the aggregate states of the economy and on the distribution of firms because these
two elements influence the level of sovereign borrowing and also the aggregate demand for
debt of firms. This multiplier reflects the marginal utility of the intermediaries’ wealth, so
the higher the value it takes the more binding the constraint will be.
Equations (1.7) and (1.8) define the price at which the government and a firm with productivity z choosing k′ and b′ can borrow. Part of the structure of these pricing functions
has standard features, such as being decreasing in the expected future probability of default
or being increasing in the recovery in case of default. Notice that the Lagrange multiplier
for loanable funds is present in these functions. When the loanable funds constraint binds,
which is likely to happen when public debt is high enough, the price at which the government and firms can borrow decreases. The latter is equivalent to an increase in the interest
rate paid on loans. The value that the multiplier takes is such that the loanable funds con-

13. The Lagrange multiplier for the limited liability constraint in period 2 is always 0, as the non-negativity
constraint will never bind. To see this note that period 2 dividends are composed by the sum of nonnegative payouts of assets.
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straint is met with equality, so different magnitudes of µ could be observed depending on
the dynamics of public debt.

1.2.3 Sovereign
The sovereign issues one-period non-state contingent bonds B at a price qg . The primary
balance of the sovereign is given by a fiscal reaction function, which depends on an aggregate fiscal shock ε ∈ [ε , ε ] that follows a Markov process with CDF Gs (ε ′ |ε ), and on the
level of the outstanding debt in the current period. Thus, at period t, the primary balance
is given by Pbt = n(Bt , εt ). This formulation is in line with the literature on public debt
sustainability, initiated by Bohn (1998), and also used in the analysis of debt crises, as in
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013). As Bohn (1998) showed, a sufficient condition for the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government to hold is that there is a (conditional)
positive response of the primary balance to lagged debt. The fiscal reaction function can
also exhibit non-linear responses to lagged debt, as it will be specified below, in order to
capture the possibility of “fiscal fatigue”, as in Ghosh et al. (2013), and still be consistent
with fiscal solvency. For low levels of public debt the primary balance slightly increases as
debt rises, for higher levels of debt there is a much larger response, but at some point the
response of the primary balance weakens.
Finally, the sovereign defaults with probability pg . This is a function of the amount of
borrowing, and which is modeled by the following reduced form structure:
g
pt+1
= min{max {αs + βs Bt+1 , 0}, 1}

(1.10)

The likelihood of default will have a direct effect on the price at which the sovereign can
borrow, as will be specified in the financial intermediation section. Given that sovereign
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borrowing can potentially crowd-out private investment, qg will be a function of the distribution of firms and aggregate states.
The dynamics of debt, then, are obtained from the budget constraint of the sovereign:
qtg (Bt+1 ; St , Γt )Bt+1 = Bt − Pbt (St )

(1.11)

Bt+1 ≤ arg max qtg (B̂t+1 ; St , Γt )B̂t+1
B̂t+1

where Bt+1 (St , Γt ) = B(St , Γt ) is the policy function for debt.
The budget constraint of the sovereign imposes endogenous debt limits. To see this,
note that the right-hand-side of equation (1.11) is given for the current states of the economy
St . Given St , Γt , the left-hand-side forms the familiar Laffer curve for debt (i.e., for Bt+1 ),
but there is no guarantee that even at the level of debt that maximizes the resources raised
the equality will hold. Two cases can occur. In the first one there are two values of Bt+1
that solve equation (1.11), which is equivalent to say that these two values produce the
same revenue. If this is the case, the lowest amount of debt is selected. In the second case
there is no value of Bt+1 that solves the mentioned equality. Here, debt is set to be equal to
g

B̂t+1 = arg max qt (B̂t+1 ; St , Γt )B̂t+1 , and the primary balance is adjusted correspondingly.
In order to maintain consistency of the sovereign’s problem, the primary balance is
redefined by:

Pbt (St , Γt ) =




n(Bt , εt )

if



Bt − B̂t+1

if

Bt − n(Bt , εt ) < B̂t+1

(1.12)

Bt − n(Bt , εt ) ≥ B̂t+1

Lastly, government revenues at period t are given by τ̂ (St , Γt ) = τ × πt (St , Γt ). In order to ensure that the fiscal reaction function for primary balance is consistent with tax
revenues, a transfer Tt to households is considered. This transfer is such that Tt (St , Γt ) =
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τ̂ (St , Γt ) − Pb(St , Γt ) for t ≥ 0.

1.2.4 Households
Households in this model are assumed to be identical, risk-neutral agents that own firms and
consume an endowment M̄ plus transfers from the government Tt . The structure assumed
for the households simplifies the setting of the model and allows to focus on the firm sector,
which is going to be the relevant actor for the transmission of financial shocks towards the
real economy.

1.2.5 Equilibrium
Given an initial distribution Γ0 , a Recursive Markov Equilibrium consists in a value functions for the firm V , policy functions b̂, k̂, d,ˆ B, pricing functions q, qg , µ , and a law of
motion Ω such that:
(i) Given B, µ , q, Γ and Ω, V (z, k, b; S, Γ) solves the problem of the firm and k̂(z, k, b; S, Γ),
ˆ k, b; S, Γ) are the corresponding policy functions for capital,
b̂(z, k, b; S, Γ) and d(z,
debt, and default.
(ii) qs (S, Γ) and q(z, k, b; S, Γ) solve the pricing equation of financial intermediaries.
(iii) µ (S, Γ) is consistent with the slackness condition of financial intermediaries.
(iv) Γ evolves according to Γ′ = Ω(S, Γ).
(v) Budget constraint of the sovereign holds.
(vi) Aggregate resource constraint holds.
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1.2.6 Understanding the Mechanism of the Model: A 2-Period Case
This section provides a 2-period version of the full model presented above. In order to
highlight the economic intuition of the mechanism driving the model.
In the first period firms have an initial capital k0 and productivity z0 . They decide
how much to invest, borrow, produce, and whether to issue equity or not. The production
technology is the same as the one specified above. Debt is defaultable, and equity issuance
is costly. Firms are subject to an operational fixed cost F in both periods. Firms issue equity
whenever dividends in period 1 become negative. In period 2, if firms do not default, they
repay their debt and produce.14
The problem of the firm is given by:

max

{e0 ,e1 ,k1 ,b1 }

e0 − Λ(e0 )Φ{e0 < 0} + β Ez1|z0 [e1 ]

s.t.

(1.13)
(1.14)

e0 = z0 k0α − k1 + q(b1 )b1 − F
e1 = z1 k1α − F − b1
where et denote period t = 0, 1 dividends, Φ = is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 in
case the firm issues equity, and 0 otherwise, and Λ(e) = e2 denotes the equity issuance cost
function.
Define the financing gap of a firm as the difference between resources needed to operate
and invest minus the resources available to do so. Given k1 and b1 , the financing gap is

14. In period 2 dividends cannot be negative, as the firm would prefer to default. Thus, there is no equity
issuance in period 2.
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given by the following expression:
Financing Gap = k1 + F − z0 k0α − q(b1 )b1

(1.15)

A firm is constrained whenever the financing gap is strictly positive, and unconstrained
if the opposite occurs. Note that a constrained firm, conditional on k1 and b1 , does not have
enough resources to finance its investment. Hence, it needs to rely also on equity issuance.
The amount of equity issued is such that the financing gap is met.
Let k1∗ and b∗1 denote the unconstrained solutions for capital and debt in period 1, respeci1
h ∗
k1 +F−q(b∗1 )b∗1 α
∗
tively. The “marginally constrained firm” has an initial capital given by k0 =
.
z0
Defining size as the amount of capital, we can conclude that a firm with initial size greater
or equal than k0∗ will be unconstrained, while if the opposite is true then the firm will be
constrained. Hence, whenever k0 < k0∗ the firm will have a positive financing gap and will
issue equity.
The combined first order conditions of the firm’s problem (assuming differentiability
of the pricing function of debt), for a firm with initial capital k0 and productivity z0 , yield
the following conditions:


β Ez1 |z0 α z1 k1α −1 = 1 + Λ′ (e0 )Φ{e0 < 0}

(q(b1) + q′ (b1 )b1 )(1 + Λ′ (e0 )Φ{e0 < 0}) = β · Pr (e1 > 0)

(1.16)
(1.17)

These conditions are a central part of the model’s mechanism because they imply that
constrained and unconstrained firms choose different investment and leverage levels. To
see this, consider equation (1.16) first. For a constrained firm issuing equity, the righthand-side is strictly greater than 1 (given that Λ′ (·) > 0), which implies that this type of
firm has a higher marginal product of capital in period 1 than an unconstrained firm. Given
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that the production function has decreasing returns to scale, this means that the capital
accumulation for period 1 is smaller than for an unconstrained firm. Equation (1.17) implies
that the marginal benefit of debt is higher for a constrained firm that is issuing equity. The
intuition for this is that for every unit borrowed the firm saves the equity issuance cost,
which makes debt more attractive. Comparing again with an unconstrained firm, we see
that a constrained firm tends to use more debt in relation to its size, and thus has a higher
leverage ratio (measured as b1 /k0 ). Lastly, note that constrained firms issue equity and use
debt at the same time, which implies that they have a more expensive financing mix than
unconstrained firms.
The previous paragraphs showed how small (constrained) and large (unconstrained)
behave in terms of their investment and how they finance it. We now explain how these
features interact with the rest of the elements in the model. Assume that the sovereign
borrows an amount B1 at a price qg , and that its initial primary balance and debt are Pb0 =
−ε0 and B0 > 0, respectively. Regarding the representative financial intermediary, assume
an identical setting as the one specified earlier (where pricing functions are determined in
a similar way). Lastly, for simplicity, assume that a fraction m of firms in the economy
has initial capital k0s < k0∗ (and hence a fraction 1 − m has capital k0l > k0∗ ). Given this,
the funding constraint that the intermediary faces is q1 (B1 (B0 , ε ))B1(B0 , ε ) + m · q(bs1 )bs1 +
g

(1 − m) · q(bl1)bl1 ≤ A, with a corresponding Lagrange multiplier µ (B0 , ε , m).
Assume that the realization of ε is such that the lending constraint binds. Then, qg1 (B1 ),
q(bs1 ), and q(bl1) decrease, as µ (B0 , ε , m) > 0 because the constraint binds and the demand
for funds needs to be consistent with the supply of them. A decrease in the price lowers
the marginal benefit of debt, measured as the resources obtained for every unit borrowed,
for both types of firms. This makes them substitute debt for equity or internal resources.
Initially constrained firms will issue even more equity, which directly affects more their
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investment in relation to initially unconstrained firms. To see this more clearly, consider
again equation (1.16). Given that Λ(·)′′ > 0, issuing more equity increases even further
the marginal product of capital for period 1, which implies that investment is decreasing
more for a firm that was constrained initially. This is the key mechanism of the model.
The financial frictions that firms face shape their financing structure, and these are sizedependent. Thus, firms of different sizes respond differently to the same financial shock,
measured as an increase (decrease) in µ (q).
To conclude this subsection, note that the aggregate effect of the financial shock depends on the fraction of firms that are initially constrained, but there are two channels
operating. The first channel is the most evident one, which is determined by the composition of firms in the economy. This is, small firms adjust more their investment than large
firms, so an economy that is composed by a large fraction of small firms should have a
larger response to the same shock than an economy that has a larger fraction of large firms.
The second channel is a general equilibrium channel. Given that the response of the debt of
firms also varies across size, economies with different firm composition will have different
dynamics for the marginal utility of the intermediaries’ wealth. Economies with a lower
skewness in firm size distribution (i.e., a larger fraction of small firms) are more sensitive
to changes in the value of µ (because small firms adjust more when the lending constraint
binds), so a milder increase in µ is required to generate the same adjustment than in a
higher skewness economy. Both of these channels are operating at the same time, so a
quantitative analysis is required in order to see which type of economy (i.e., less skewed
firm size distribution v. more skewed) will adjust more in the presence of a financial shock.
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1.3

Quantitative Analysis

1.3.1 Model Solution & Calibration
The presence of aggregate risk in the model makes the distribution of firms a relevant
state variable that plays a key role in pricing functions of sovereign and firm debt. Firm
distribution is a high-dimensional, so keeping track of it is computationally very difficult.
In order to deal with this problem, we follow the approach of Krusell and Smith (1998)
and assume that agents are boundedly rational in their perception of how the distribution
evolves. We assume that the dynamics of the firm size distribution are approximated by a
set of moments. In particular, the distribution is summarized by the cross-sectional variance
of capital, and firms consider the marginal utility of the intermediaries’ wealth (a market
clearing price) to be a state variable and use a linear autoregressive linear to forecast future
values of these objects. This approach is similar to the one employed in Krusell and Smith
(1997), but it differs on the fact that here the price follows an autoregressive rule. The
algorithm used to solve the model is described in the Appendix.15 The results from the
Krusell-Smith regressions are also presented in the same section of the Appendix.
The calibration of the model proceeds as follows. We start by setting the values of a
subset of parameters that can be obtained directly from the data or the literature (external
calibration). We then set the rest of the parameters of the model to match specific targets
from firm-level data (internal calibration), which are chosen in order to be consistent with
observed moments of the cross-section of Spanish firms at a yearly frequency.16
External Calibration

The discount factor of firms β is set to 0.96, which is a standard

15. An additional complication that arises in this setting is that the problem of the firm has kinks and nonconcavities, which makes difficult to solve this problem using collocation methods or methods that rely
on first order conditions. Hence, the problem of the firm is solved via value function iteration.
16. All of the moments that are targeted in the calibration are those obtained for the 2005-2008 period, in
order to avoid the large distortions of the Great Recession and also to check the external validity of the
model.
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value in the literature. The value for the capital depreciation rate δ is 0.11, which is in line
with data from EU KLEMS for depreciation of Spanish capital. The production function
parameter, α , is set to be α = 0.65, consistent with the estimates of Hennessy and Whited
(2007), using cross-sectional data of non-financial, unregulated firms from Compustat. The
recovery parameter for the financial intermediaries is set to match the recovery rates of
subordinated debt provided by Moody’s (22.9%). The recovery rate defined in the model
is θ k(1 − δ )/b. The average leverage ratio of Spanish firms in the Amadeus database for
the 2005-2008 period is b/k = 0.55, and the depreciation rate of Spanish capital is 0.11.
Replacing these values in the recovery rate of the model yields θ (1 − 0.11)/0.55 = 0.229,
which implies θ = 0.142. The corporate effective tax rate is set to be τ = 0.224, in line
with data from the Spanish Ministry of Finance.
The fiscal reaction function follows the structure of Ghosh et al. (2013). They specify a
reaction function of the form: PBt = ν0 + ν1 B + ν2 B2 + ν3 B3 + ε . Hence, this rule requires
setting 4 parameter values. For the intercept, ν0 is set to 6.464 in order to match the average (pre Great Recession) ratio of gross public debt-to-output of Spain (according to the
IMF WEO). The rest of the parameters are set to equal those found by Ghosh et al. (2013).
Lastly, the parameters of rule for the sovereign’s default probability are αs = −0.036 and

βs = 0.094. We obtain these parameter values from a linear estimation where the independent variable is the gross public debt-to-output ratio, and the dependent variable is the
yearly default probability implied by CDS spreads of 1-year Spanish sovereign bonds.17
The data sources are IMF WEO and Markit.
Internal Calibration

We choose 6 parameters of the model to match moments of the

firm-level data. The problem of the firm is relatively non-linear, and most moments are
altered when one parameter value changes. In order to find a reasonable set of initial
17. A 1-year maturity could reflect more accurately sovereign default risk as it is closest to a (potential)
default episode.
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parameters, we solve a reduced version of the full model. This reduced version is a partial
equilibrium model, where firms face an aggregate shock that increases the interest rate
at which they borrow. We solve the simplified version 30,000 times. For every time the
model is solved there is an initial random draw of a vector of parameters from a uniform
distribution. Thus, for every draw of parameters, there is a corresponding set of moments.
We then plot the median of different moments for given values of parameters (discretized
grids). This provides useful information regarding which moments are more sensitive to
each parameter.
We assume that the productivity process z follows a log-AR(1) structure:
log(z′ ) = ρz log(z) + σzε

(1.18)

where ε ∼ N (0, 1), ρz is the autoregressive coefficient, and σz is the variance of the productivity process. The productivity is discretized following Tauchen (1986). The values of

ρz and σz are internally calibrated, and are set so as to target the autocorrelation of profitsto-capital ratio ((zkα − F)/k), which is equal to 0.858, and the cross-sectional standard
deviation of the investment to capital ratio (i/k), equal to 0.219.
The parameter of the adjustment cost of capital, ψ , is set to be ψ = 0.064, in order to
match the average autocorrelation of i/k observed in the data (0.186). The fixed operational
cost, F, targets the default ratio of firms which is roughly 2%, and is set to F = 0.026. The
equity issuance cost parameter, λ , is equal to 5.428 and is chosen to target the average
leverage ratio of firms observed in the data, which is 0.55. Lastly, the endowment of the
financial intermediary is set to be Ā = 0.251 so the average interest rate faced by firms is
roughly 4%, a value that is common in the literature.
Summary of the Calibration & Model Fit

A list of all the parameter values obtained

in this calibration to Spain are presented in Table 2.1:
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Table 1.4: Parameter Values
Parameter

Value

Description

Target

ρz

0.796

AR Coef. Productivity

Autocorrelation of Profits

σz

0.198

Std. Dev Productivity

Std. Dev. of i/k

ψ

0.064

Investment Adjustment Cost

Autocorrelation of i/k

F

0.026

Fixed Cost

Firm Default Rate

λ

5.428

Equity Issuance Cost

Firm Leverage b/k

Ā

0.251

Bank Endowment

Average Interest Rate

β

0.960

Firm Discount Factor

Standard

δ

0.110

Capital Depreciation

EU KLEMS

α

0.650

Capital Share

Hennessy and Whited (2007)

θ

0.142

Recovery rate

Moody’s

τ

0.224

Tax Rate

Spanish Ministry of Finance

ν0

6.464

Primary Balance

Spanish Government Debt/GDP

ν1

-0.225

Primary Balance

Ghosh et al. (2013)

ν2

0.003

Primary Balance

Ghosh et al. (2013)

ν3

0.000

Primary Balance

Ghosh et al. (2013)

αs

-0.036

Sov. Def. Prob. (I)

IMF WEO & Markit

βs

0.094

Sov. Def. Prob.(S)

IMF WEO & Markit

The process for the aggregate fiscal shock is represented as a 2-state Markov process
with high and low values (ε , ε ). In order to calibrate the transition matrix of this process,
we use the time series for the Spanish primary fiscal balance, from 1950 to 2010. This
information is obtained from the Public Finances in Modern History database of the IMF
(Mauro et al., 2013). We define a low-realization period whenever the primary balance
is below its long-run average minus one standard deviation, and a high-realization period
if the opposite occurs. Using this definition, we construct the transition probabilities by
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identifying the frequency with which the time series transitions between the two states.
The transition matrix for the process is:








′
′
 Pr(ε = ε |ε = ε ) Pr(ε = ε |ε = ε )   0.943 0.057 
P =

=
′
′
Pr(ε = ε |ε = ε ) Pr(ε = ε |ε = ε )
0.250 0.750

In order to assess the fit of the model we compute moments from simulations of the
model and contrast them with those of the actual data, which we obtain from Spanish firms
in the Amadeus database. Table 1.5 presents the comparison of moments.
Table 1.5: Targeted and Non-targeted Moments
Targeted

Model

Data

Default rate

0.017

0.020

Leverage (b/k)

0.550

0.547

Cross-sectional Std. Dev. of i/k

0.291

0.219

Autocorrelation of i/k

0.200

0.186

Autocorrelation of π /k

0.772

0.858

Investment-capital ratio i/k

0.151

0.128

Equity Issuance Frequency

0.108

0.098

Profits-assets ratio π /k

0.178

0.103

Cross-sectional Std. Dev. π /k

0.126

0.149

Cross-sectional Std. Dev. b/k

0.203

0.262

Autocorrelation of b/k

0.750

0.903

Non-targeted

Except for the cross-sectional volatility of the investment to capital ratio, the model does
a reasonable job in terms of fitting targeted moments of Spanish firm-level data. Regarding
non-targeted moments, the model performs relatively well in terms of approximating non30

targeted moments. The fact that the model performs reasonably well in terms of matching
these firm-level features suggests that it is a good benchmark for studying the transmission
of financial shocks to the real economy.
Policy Functions & Model Mechanism

The 2-period model presented in section 1.2

suggested that small firms, which are more financially constrained than large ones, would
reduce more their investment in comparison to large firms as a response to the financial
shock. Using the solved model we can assess if the policy functions produce results that
are consistent with these predictions.
Define the financing gap of the full model by:
FG(z, k, b; S, Γ) = k′ (z, k, b; S, Γ) + b + Ψ(k′(z, k, b; S, Γ), k) − (1 − τ )(zkα − F)

(1.19)

− k(1 − δ ) − q(z, k′(z, k, b; S, Γ), b′(z, k, b; S, Γ); S, Γ)b′(z, k, b; S, Γ)
where x′ (z, k, b; S, Γ) corresponds to the policy function of variable x as a function of the
state variables of the firm.
As in section 1.2, the financing gap reflects the difference between the resources the
firm needs to operate, minus the resources the firm can raise without issuing equity. We
say that a firm is constrained if the financing gap is strictly positive, and it needs to issue
equity in order to operate. We say a firm is unconstrained if the financing gap is negative.
We use the policy functions obtained from the solution of the model to construct the
financing gap. The state-space of the model is highly-dimensional, so we focus on one
particular set of states: we set the productivity to be equal to the average of the process, and
the sovereign debt-to-output ratio is set to the long-run average of Spain. We then proceed
to compare the financing gaps and policy functions between the high and low realization of
the aggregate shock, which reflects an increase in the financing costs of firms. Figure 1.1
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presents 3 heat maps that show the differences in the financing gap, capital for next period
k′ , and leverage b′ /k, between the low and high financing cost scenarios.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.1 shows the differences in the financing gaps when the financial
costs increase. A positive value denotes an increase in the financing gap. The heat map
shows that an increase in the financing costs increases the financing gap mostly for highly
indebted firms (white part of the map), but also for some medium-sized firms and small
firms that were initially highly levered. Panel (b) shows the percentage changes in capital
k′ when the financing costs increase. The firms that reduce their capital the most for next
period are small and indebted (the same group for which the financing gap increased the
most), and also some medium-sized ones. For these groups capital decreases by roughly
20%. Large firms also reduce their capital, but by a much lower amount, around 8%. Panel
(c) shows the percentage changes for leverage. We observe a similar pattern than in the
case of capital.
The results presented in Figure 1.1 are in line with the predictions of the 2-period model.
Constrained firms reduce their investment the most upon an increase in financial costs.
These firms also tend to be small and using a large amount (relative to their size) of debt.
It is important to note that this analysis is fixing variables of the state space. For a more
in-depth understanding, it is necessary to allow for these variable to endogenously adjust.
This kind of analysis is presented in the next subsections.

32

Figure 1.1: Policy Function Heat maps - Increase in Financing Costs
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1.3.2 Aggregate and Firm-Level Dynamics
This subsection focuses on analyzing the responses of the economy upon a sharp increase
in sovereign debt. We perform two sets of exercises. The first set focuses on aggregate
behavior, assessing to what extent the dynamics of the model are consistent with those of
the data. The second one shows the responses conditioning on firm size, to see if the model
is able to deliver patterns where small firms adjust more than large ones, as observed in the
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data.
We examine aggregate and firm-level dynamics by computing impulse response functions to an increase of sovereign debt consistent with the increase in the ratio of gross debtto-GDP observed in Spain in 2012 (from 69.5% to 85.7%). The procedure to compute the
impulse response functions is the one presented in Gilchrist et al. (2014), and is described
in the Appendix. Figure 1.2 presents the impulse response functions (IRFs) for aggregate
output, capital, debt, and leverage. We see that output drops by roughly 4%, which is larger
than the observed decline in Spanish real output in 2012, which was close to 3%. The
economy reduces its leverage, by around 2.5%, which is consistent with the evolution of
capital and debt, where the latter adjusts more than the former. These responses show that
a sharp increase in sovereign debt can generate important fluctuations in output. However,
these responses may not be necessarily the ones observed on the equilibrium path of the
model, given that an exogenous sequence was fed to the model in order to generate them.
The observed dynamics in the IRFs are generated by a specific shock at particular initial
conditions of the economy. In order to assess whether these observed dynamics are also
observed without setting specific initial conditions, we perform an event-study analysis
using the simulated dataset. We define the event as a situation in which sovereign debt is
one standard deviation above its long-run mean. We show the dynamics of the relevant
variables (which are aggregated according to the time-varying distribution) in a 10-period
window centered on the event date. These dynamics correspond to the average across all
the identified events in the simulations. Figure 1.3 presents the results of the event study.
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Response Functions - Aggregates
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The results of the event study show that around the event date the sovereign debt-tooutput ratio increases by around 15 percentage points, which is close to the actual increase
during 2012 for the Spanish case. Output is about 0.3% below its long-run average at the
event and continues dropping to roughly 2% below its mean, 3 years after. This gap of
1.7 percentage points corresponds to the decline in output after the event and is roughly
half of the observed decline in real Spanish output. The dynamics of capital also follow a
similar pattern to the one of output (given the specification of the production function of
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the model, where output and capital are proportional at the firm-level). Interestingly, we
observe that firm debt (i) adjusts strongly around the event, and (ii) starts reacting even
before the large increase in sovereign debt. This forward-looking behavior is consistent
with firms internalizing an increasing path in sovereign debt and thus a potentially binding
lending constraint for financial intermediaries in the future. In this way firms start adjusting
accordingly, especially after the increasing path in sovereign debt is realized. The marginal
utility of the intermediaries’ wealth takes a bit of time to react, as it starts increasing one
period before the event, but it then rises sharply to being roughly 8% above its long-run
average.
We study next firm-level responses. The purpose is to assess if the model is able to
generate patterns similar to those observed in the firm-level data. Recall from the empirical
section that during the European debt crisis small firms reduced more their sales, assets,
and liabilities in comparison to large firms. Figure 1.4 presents the IRFs to the same shock
specified for the results in Figure 1.2. The results show that indeed small firms adjust
much more aggressively: their output, leverage, capital, and debt drops more than for large
firms (differences of 6.5, 6.25, 8, and 13 percentage points, respectively). These results
support the theoretical predictions of the 2-period model of section 1.2 and the analysis of
the policy functions performed in this section: small firms reduce more their investment
than large firms when their financing costs increase. This is because small firms rely more
on equity. When the cost of debt increases due to the financial shock, these firms are forced
to substitute debt for equity, but given that it is increasingly costly and that they were
already issuing equity, using this external financing source comes at a large cost. Another
factor that makes the responses of small and large firms to differ is that the fixed cost of
production pushes small firms closer to the default cutoff. This affects the price at which
they can borrow, and also how far they can go with issuing equity.
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Figure 1.3: Event Study
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Functions - Firm-Level
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(d) Debt

As shown in section 1.2, the key elements of the model that allow it to generate a
pattern where small firms adjust more than large firms upon a financial shock are the costly
equity issuance and the imperfect substitution between external financing alternatives. To
illustrate this point, consider what would happen if equity issuance is not allowed. This is
a common feature in corporate finance models, as it simplifies the computation. Ottonello
and Winberry (2018), for example, find that firms in the US (listed in Compustat) respond
to monetary policy shocks, but in their case, less levered firms are more sensitive. In
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the context of this model, more levered firms are those who face a larger financing gap
and want to avoid excessive equity issuance, so they will be more responsive to financial
shocks. Thus, whether there is equity issuance or not in the model can potentially affect the
responses that firms will have in terms of their sizes. Figure 1.5 presents the response of
output when equity issuance is not allowed. When there is no equity issuance, the responses
are less marked in terms of small, large and the aggregate economy. Also, surprisingly, the
type of firm that adjusts most is flipped: when there is no equity issuance, large firms adjust
more than small firms, a pattern that is opposite to what is observed during the European
debt crisis. The core of this paper is not to explain these differences, but it is an interesting
result from the modeling point of view because assuming that firms can not issue equity
is not innocuous. When equity issuance is not possible, small firms internalize that by
borrowing too much they might be pushed to the default cutoff in the case financing costs
sharply increase, as they will not able to rollover their debt. These firms are constrained,
and they have no other source of external financing, so they borrow less. Thus, financing
cost shocks have less severe effects on them than on large firms, which can rely on internal
resources, as they will be unconstrained with a higher likelihood.
Figure 1.5: Impulse Response Function of Output - No Equity Issuance
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1.3.3 The Relevance of Firm Heterogeneity
This subsection studies the role of firm heterogeneity on the responses of the economy to
an increase in sovereign borrowing. In particular, two economies are contrasted, one with
heterogeneous firms and one with a representative firm. Additionally, the responses of two
economies composed by heterogeneous firms but with different distributions are computed,
to assess the role of firm size distribution on the economy.
As seen in the previous section, small and large firms face different financing conditions
and respond differently to the same kind of stimulus. It is important to note that asymmetric
responses in terms of firm size do not guarantee that the composition of firms will matter
for aggregates. For example, in Krusell and Smith (1998), the policy functions of agents in
the model are almost linear and with the same slope. In addition to this, a large fraction of
agents is rich enough to be in the linear part of the policy function. Thus, redistribution of
wealth virtually has no effect on aggregate consumption. Another example is the case of
Bernanke et al. (1999), where firms are linearly scalable in their net worth, rendering the
role of the distribution of firms irrelevant. This section studies whether in this setting the
heterogeneity of firms and the distribution are relevant.
Two exercises are performed in order to assess the relevance of firm heterogeneity. In
the first, firm heterogeneity is nearly shut down by setting the variance of the productivity component equal to 20% of the original, and re-calibrating the rest of the parameters
of the model.18 By proceeding in this way, the “no heterogeneity” framework resembles
a model with a representative firm. Then, we compute impulse response functions to a
sharp increase in sovereign borrowing. The second exercise consists in computing impulse response functions that are conditional on different levels of skewness of the firm
size distribution. This provides an alternative to assess whether firm size distribution is
18. The targeted moments are the same, except for the cross-sectional variance of the investment to capital
ratio.
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quantitatively important, and also to study if economies with larger skewness adjust more
or less than those with a smaller skewness.
Figure 1.6 presents the IRFs of aggregate responses for the baseline economy (“heterogeneity”) and an economy calibrated to have a standard deviation of productivity equal to

σzNo Het = 0.2 × σz , a substantially lower degree of heterogeneity. The economy with firm
heterogeneity responds much more to the increase in government debt. Fluctuations in output in the baseline case are nearly twice than those in the no-heterogeneity case, while similar differences are observed for debt and capital. Regarding leverage, the differences are
even larger. The baseline economy adjusts nearly 3 times more than in the no-heterogeneity
scenario. These differences show that the composition of firms in the economy quantitatively matters, and that firm heterogeneity is a substantial source of amplification in terms
of the responses of key macroeconomic aggregates.
The next exercise compares the responses of economies with high and low skewness of
the firm size distribution.19 In the first one, there is a bigger share of large firms. Intuitively,
given that large firms adjust less when facing a financial shock, we should expect to see
that an economy with greater firm size skewness adjusts less in aggregate terms. Figure
1.7 presents the comparison of the IRFs of these two economies. The IRFs for the “high
skewness” case is the benchmark, while the “low skewness” consists on the responses to the
same shock as the benchmark economy but conditioning the variance of capital (aggregate
moment on the policy function) to be 50% of the baseline scenario.

19. The economy with low skewness has a skewness equal to 50% of the high skewness case.
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Figure 1.6: Impulse Response Functions - Heterogeneity v. No Heterogeneity
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Output and capital respond roughly 25% more in the economy with lower skewness.
The differences are smaller in the case of leverage and debt. These results suggest that the
differences come from the right tail of the distribution of firm size, as it is mainly where the
two economies differ. A less skewed distribution still includes a similar density of small
firms, but it contains a significantly lower density of large firms. Thus, differences in the
skewness of distributions can account for observed gaps in the responses of two different
economies.
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Figure 1.7: Impulse Response Functions - Low v. High Skewness
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The results of these two exercises show that firm heterogeneity and the distribution
of firms are relevant quantitatively. Firm heterogeneity generates responses of output that
are twice the size of those of an economy with no firm heterogeneity. Additionally, the
skewness of the firm size distribution accounts for up to 25% of the observed differences
(in the data across low and high skewness cases) firm in the responses of output.
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1.3.4 The Role of Financial Frictions
This subsection studies the role that financial frictions play in the aggregate responses to a
financial shock caused by a sharp increase in sovereign borrowing. In particular, it focuses
on the role that costly equity issuance has on the responses of firms to the financial shock.
Section 1.2 showed how financial frictions in the model generate different responses for
large and small firms when financing costs increase. The imperfect substitution between
equity and debt was a key element to generate those asymmetric responses. Figure 1.8
shows the IRFs for an economy with no equity issuance costs, but with defaultable debt.20
Figure 1.8 presents the responses of the baseline economy and the economy without
equity issuance costs. The differences are striking. In the costless equity issuance case,
the drop in output, leverage, capital, and debt is barely noticeable when comparing it to
the baseline case. For example, we see that output in the baseline case drops by roughly
4%, while in the costless equity issuance scenario it drops by 0.5%. Similar patterns can
be drawn from the rest of the variables. These results suggest that financial frictions play
a key role in the amplification of the responses to financial shocks. The intuition for this
is similar to the one provided in the 2-period model presented in section 1.2. Debt and
equity are imperfect substitutes because debt is defaultable and equity issuance is costly.
Thus, switching debt for equity (which is triggered by the financial shock) comes at a cost,
which generates size-dependent adjustments in the investment of firms. If equity issuance
is costless, then there is no additional cost for the firm when switching from debt to equity,
which implies that the adjustments in investment triggered by financial shocks should be
significantly lower. This is corroborated by the results presented in Figure 1.8.

20. Some degree of financial friction is needed in order to generate responses to the financial shock. In a
completely frictionless environment firms would automatically choose their optimal level of capital, and
finance investment with any of the two external financing alternatives.
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Figure 1.8: Impulse Response Functions - No Equity Issuance Cost
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Lastly, notice that firm heterogeneity loses its amplification in the absence of financial
frictions. Recall from Figure 1.6 that firm heterogeneity amplifies the responses of the
variables of interest to the financial shock. In the costless equity issuance scenario, aggregate responses to the financial shock are negligible (in relation to the baseline case), which
leaves little space for the amplification that firm heterogeneity generates.
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1.4

Conclusions

This paper examines the role that firm heterogeneity and financial frictions play in terms of
the propagation of financial shocks to the real economy. The recent European debt crisis
provides a natural experiment to study these issues. During this crisis, a sudden deterioration of the credit conditions faced by firms in the GIIPS countries generated asymmetric responses at the firm level, which differed according to firm size. Empirical evidence
suggests that one channel through which this deterioration occurred is a “crowding out”
channel, by which increased government borrowing and bank holdings of sovereign debt
generated a crowding-out of private lending, reducing funds available to firms and increasing their financing costs.
The empirical section of this paper documented two new facts regarding the response
of firms in the GIIPS countries during the debt crisis using a rich panel dataset at the
firm-level. It is observed that (i) smaller firms adjusted their sales, liabilities, assets and
employment more than large firms, and (ii) smaller firms experienced smaller adjustments
in these variables in economies with more skewed firm size distributions. The data also
show that financing costs, measured as the ratio of debt service to total debt, increased
more for smaller firms.
This paper proposed a model to explain the above two facts, and derived its quantitative
implications. The model has three main components. First, firms that are heterogeneous in
terms of productivity, capital and debt, and face financial frictions in the form of defaultable debt and costly equity issuance. Second, financial intermediaries that lend to firms
and the government, facing an occasionally binding constraint on loanable funds. Third,
a government that causes the occasionally binding constraint to bind when public debt increases sharply. When this occurs, the resources available for firm lending decreases, which
generates an increase in their financing costs. Firms have different financing structures con46

ditional on their size because debt and equity are imperfect substitutes. In particular, small
firms will tend to rely more on equity than debt and thus face a more expensive financing
mix. The financial shock will force firms to substitute debt for internal resources or equity.
Small firms issue even more equity (which is increasingly costly), which forces them to
adjust their investment more aggressively than large firms.
In this framework firm heterogeneity has aggregate implications. In the presence of
financial frictions, the financial shock affects the evolution of the distribution of firms,
and hence the dynamics of aggregate outcomes such as output. The model predicts that
an economy with a less skewed firm size distribution faces larger drops in output upon
a financial shock. The intuition for this result is that economies with a higher fraction
of small firms (i.e., less skewed firm size distribution) will tend to adjust more because
small firms are more sensitive to the financing cost shock. This pattern resembles the one
observed in European debt crisis, where Portugal (an economy with low skewness on firm
size distribution) faced larger drops in output than Spain (an economy with larger skewness
than Portugal).
The model was calibrated to firm-level and aggregate data for Spain. Quantitative results show that for an increase in sovereign debt consistent with the Spanish case, experienced during the European debt crisis, the model predicts that small firms adjust more than
large ones, and that smaller firms would have adjusted less if the economy had a larger firmsize dispersion. Regarding the aggregate effects of firm heterogeneity, the model generates
an output drop of roughly half the size of the drop observed in Spain. Comparing with the
results for the same model setup but with a representative firm, output drops by 2 percentage points more (with respect to its long-run average), in the economy with heterogeneous
firms. Thus, firm heterogeneity along with the presence of financial frictions significantly
amplifies the responses of aggregate variables to a tightening in credit conditions.
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Chapter 2
Positive and Normative Implications of
Liability Dollarization for Sudden Stops
Models of Macroprudential Policy21
A nontrivial fraction of financial intermediation in emerging markets is characterized by
what Calvo (2002) labeled “liability dollarization:” Banks intermediate capital inflows denominated in hard currencies (i.e. units of tradable goods) into domestic loans denominated
in national currencies (i.e. units of national consumer prices). In South Korea or Mexico,
for example, dollar inflows are lent out typically in domestic currency units, and the same
happens with a sizable share of Euro and Swiss Franc inflows in the emerging markets of
Eastern Europe. A report by the Bank for International Settlements showed that in 2007,
just before the global financial crisis, the ratio of foreign currency liabilities to total liabilities of commercial banks in emerging markets was about 40 percent in Latin America, 25
percent in Europe, and 15 percent in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and the median ra21. Coauthored with Enrique G. Mendoza. This paper was prepared for the IMF’s Eighteenth Jacques Polak
Annual Research Conference.
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tio of external liabilities to gross loans in emerging markets was about 36 percent.22 Using
IMF data, Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) reported that in 1996, just before the Asian
Crisis, the ratios of foreign liabilities to total assets in commercial banks ranged from 143
percent in Indonesia to 775 percent in Thailand.
The workhorse Sudden Stops model (SS) that has been widely used to study macroprudential policy in emerging markets to date abstracts from liability dollarization, because
it is built upon the canonical Dependent Economy framework of International Macroeconomics.23 This framework includes income and consumption of tradable and nontradable
goods but assumes that debt is denominated in units of tradables. SS models consider
a stochastic variant of this setup in which domestic agents borrow by selling non-statecontingent bonds denominated in units of tradables, facing a credit constraint by which
their debt cannot exceed a fraction of their income, part of which originates in the nontradables sector.24 The key element of SS models is that the collateral provided by nontradables
income is valued at the market-determined price of nontradable goods relative to tradables,
which yields two central implications: First, it introduces the Fisherian debt-deflation amplification mechanism, by which a binding collateral constraint triggers a feedback mechanism linking reduced borrowing capacity, decreased consumption of tradable goods, and
collapsing relative prices. Second, it introduces a “macroprudential” pecuniary externality,
by which agents do not internalize in good times the effect of their borrowing decisions on
relative prices and borrowing capacity in bad times when the credit constraint binds. These
two features of the SS setup are related, because the magnitude of the pecuniary external-

22. Capital Flows and Emerging Market Economies, CGFS Papers No. 33, Bank for International Settlements, January 2009.
23. This framework originated in the seminal articles by Salter (1959), Swan (1960), and Dı́az-Alejandro
(1965).
24. This setup originates in the work of Mendoza (2002). Studies that explore the models’ normative implications, and in particular the implications for macroprudential policy, include Bianchi (2011), Benigno
et al. (2016), Korinek (2011), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017), Bianchi et al. (2016), and Hernández and
Mendoza (2017).
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ity is determined by the size of the Fisherian amplification effect on prices (see Mendoza
(2016)). Quantitative studies (e.g. Bianchi (2011), Bianchi et al. (2016)) have shown that
both financial amplification and pecuniary externalities are large in SS models, and that optimal macroprudential policy reduces significantly the frequency and magnitude of Sudden
Stops.
The assumption that domestic debt is in units of tradables simplifies theoretical and
quantitative work with SS models significantly, but it also rules out liability dollarization
by construction. Intermediaries in these models can be viewed as either domestic or international banks that raise funds by issuing liabilities in tradables units at the world real
interest rate, and lend them to domestic agents in the same units and at that same rate
but requiring them to post collateral.25 Interestingly, previous strands of the literature on
emerging markets crises did introduce liability dollarization, particularly with the aim of
studying aggregate implications of balance sheet effects and bank failures resulting from
large devaluations (e.g. Choi and Cook (2004) and Céspedes et al. (2004)). This literature,
however, did not focus on the implications of liability dollarization for private (nonfinancial) borrowers, which are the main focus of this study.
This paper shows that modeling the effects of liability dollarization on domestic borrowers alters significantly the results derived from SS models. In particular, we propose
a model of Sudden Stops with liability dollarization (SSLD) in which intermediaries raise
funds abroad in units of tradable goods but lend them out to domestic agents in units of the
country’s aggregate consumption good, represented by a CES composite of tradables and
nontradables. As in standard SS models, the value of newly issued debt cannot exceed a
fraction of the market value of income in units of tradables. In order to focus on the effects
of liability dollarization on domestic borrowers, we assume that there are no other frictions
25. This implies that the standard SS models of macroprudential policy do not justify the use of capital
controls as an instrument to discriminate foreign v. domestic credit. See subsection 4.1 for details.
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in financial intermediation. Banks simply arbitrage the cost of raising funds abroad v. the
expected return of domestic loans. Bank liability is unlimited and there are no restrictions
on equity issuance or dividends, so that bank failures do not play a role in crisis dynamics
in the model.
Liability dollarization introduces three key effects that operate via real-exchange-rate
movements. First, if a country experiences a real appreciation, the higher “ex-post” value
of the real exchange rate increases the domestic debtors’ burden of repaying outstanding
debt, because repaying debt denominated in units of aggregate consumption takes up more
resources at a higher real exchange rate (a higher relative price of CES consumption in
units of tradables). Second, if instead of a higher current real exchange rate, the future real
exchange rate is expected to increase, arbitrage by intermediaries facing a given opportunity cost of funds raises the price they are willing to pay for newly issued domestic debt
denominated in units of aggregate consumption, which lowers the interest rate on this debt
and strengthens borrowing incentives. Third, even with unchanged current and expected
real exchange rates, the negative conditional co-variance between future marginal utility
and future real exchange rates incentivizes risk-taking (i.e. additional borrowing) because
it creates a negative premium on the domestic real interest rate, which lowers the marginal
cost of borrowing for domestic agents. Moreover, these three effects interact with precautionary savings incentives by altering the volatility of income and the expected return on
non-state-contingent domestic assets.
The three effects of liability dollarization produce major differences in the positive and
normative predictions of the SSLD model relative to SS models. Regarding positive findings, we show that under perfect foresight, the debt-repayment-burden effect has two major
implications: It makes Sudden Stops milder and multiple equilibria harder to obtain. Multiplicity requires significantly higher limits on debt-to-income ratios and income realizations
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that fall within a narrower range of relatively high values. These results are illustrated with
quantitative examples for a widely used calibration for the case of Argentina borrowed
from the work by Bianchi (2011), and also for a calibration similar to that used in the
recent study on multiplicity in SS models by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018).
The normative analysis yields three important results. First, by studying the optimal
policy of a social planner acting with commitment under uncertainty, we identify a new
pecuniary externality distorting the competitive equilibrium, which we label the “intermediation externality.” This externality co-exists with the macroprudential externality of SS
models, and results from the planner’s incentives to respond to the three effects of liability
dollarization, which are not internalized by private borrowers because they operate through
market-determined prices (i.e. real exchange rates). Moreover, this externality is present
even without credit constraints, and it can increase or reduce the social marginal cost of
borrowing relative to its private counterpart. Hence, it can result in either under-borrowing
or over-borrowing in the unregulated competitive equilibrium.
Second, we show that the optimal policy under commitment is time-inconsistent (i.e.
lacks credibility). The planner has the incentive to pledge higher future consumption to
sustain higher expected real exchange rates, and thus reduce ex-ante real interest rates at
present. Once the future arrives, however, high real exchange rates are undesirable because
of the higher debt repayment burden.
Third, the planner’s optimal policy does not justify the use of capital controls, because
it can be decentralized with an effective debt tax in which capital controls and taxes on
domestic borrowing are equivalent. As in studies of optimal macroprudential policy in SS
models with debt-to-income constraints, the planner cannot alter equilibrium allocations
when the credit constraint binds. When it does not bind, it tackles the intermediation and
macroprudential externalities by equating the social marginal cost of borrowing with its
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private counterpart, and this requires only an effective tax on debt. This debt tax can be
managed equally with just taxes on capital inflows or on domestic credit, or any mix of
both that supports the optimal effective debt tax rate. Hence, a differential tax treatment on
foreign v. domestic credit is not justified.
Since the optimal policy lacks credibility and yields a complex, nonlinear schedule of
effective debt taxes, we conduct a quantitative exploration of the effectiveness of a simple
policy strategy that uses constant taxes on domestic debt and capital inflows, using again the
calibration for Argentina taken from Bianchi (2011). In this analysis, the budgetary effects
of both taxes are transferred to domestic private agents, which allows capital controls to
prop up borrowing capacity when credit is constrained, and hence capital controls and
domestic taxes need not be equivalent. The results show that the welfare-maximizing pair
of constant taxes features a higher tax on domestic debt than on capital inflows, lowers
the probability of Sudden Stops slightly, and yields a small welfare gain (while other tax
pairs of similar magnitudes can reduce welfare sharply). Thus, under the best arrangement
of constant taxes, the use of capital controls is justified, but capital inflows are taxed at a
lower rate than domestic credit. Moreover, for tax pairs that support high effective debt
taxes, capital controls and domestic debt taxes are again equivalent, and for other pairs
welfare is higher with higher taxes on domestic debt than on capital inflows.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 describes the model and characterizes the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Section 2.2 provides a theoretical and
quantitative characterization of the differences between the SS model and SSLD models.
Section 2.3 studies optimal financial policy of a social planner acting under commitment
and conducts the quantitative analysis of constant taxes on domestic debt and capital inflows. Section 2.4 provides conclusions.
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2.1

Model Structure

2.1.1 Private agents
Consider a small open economy where a representative agent consumes tradable goods (cT )
and nontradable goods (cN ). Preferences are given by a standard expected utility function
with a constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) period utility function that depends on a
CES composite good ct :

1−γ

∞

E0 ∑ β t u(ct ),

u(ct ) =

t=0

ct
.
1−γ

(2.1)

where:
h

 i− η1
T −η
N −η
+ (1 − ω ) ct
, η > −1, ω ∈ (0, 1).
ct = ω ct

(2.2)

E(·) is the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, γ is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, and 1/(1 + η ) is the elasticity of substitution between ctT and ctN .
The relative price of nontradable goods in units of tradables is denoted ptN , and the relative price of the composite good ct in units of tradables is denoted ptc . Following standard
practice (see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) p. 227), we apply the Duality Theory of consumer choice to characterize this price as the price index that corresponds to the minimum
expenditure ctT + ptN ctN such that ct = 1. The price index is given by:

ptc



= ω

1
1+η

+ (1 − ω )

1
1+η

ptN

 1+ηη

 1+η
η

.

(2.3)

This relative price is also the economy’s consumer-price-based measure of the real exchange rate, because foreign prices are normalized to 1 for simplicity and purchasing power
parity in tradables holds, and hence the ratio of domestic to foreign consumer prices is the
same as ptc . Notice also that ptc is a monotonic, increasing function of ptN .
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The agent receives a stochastic endowment of tradable goods ytT and a fixed endowment
of nontradable goods yN , and can trade non-state-contingent bonds btc denominated in units
of ct at a price qtc with financial intermediaries. Choosing the price of tradables as the
numeraire, the agent’s budget constraint is:

c
qtc ptc bt+1
+ ctT + ptN ctN = ptc btc + ytT + ptN yN .

(2.4)

The left-hand-side of this expression shows the uses of the agent’s income in units of tradc
ables: purchases (sales) of bonds that require (generate) resources by the amount qtc ptc bt+1
c > 0 (bc < 0), plus total expenditures in consumption of tradables and nontradwhen bt+1
t+1

ables. The right-hand-side shows the sources of the agent’s income: Income from maturing
bond holdings ptc btc (or repayment of debt if btc < 0), the realization of the endowment
of tradables ytT , and the value of the nontradables endowment in units of tradables ptN yN .
The stochastic process of the tradable endowment follows a standard Markov process to be
specified later.
Borrowing requires collateral in the same way as in standard SS models. Hence, only a
fraction of the agent’s income is pledgeable as collateral, and as a result, the agent cannot
borrow more than a fraction κ of total income in units of tradables:
c
qtc ptc bt+1
≥ −κ (ytT + ptN yN ).

(2.5)

c }
The representative agent chooses the stochastic sequences {ctT , ctN , bt+1
t≥0 to maxi
mize (2.1) subject to (2.4) and (2.5), taking b0 , yN , and ptN , ptc , qtc, ytT t≥0 as given.
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2.1.2 Financial Intermediation
We assume that there are deep-pockets, risk-neutral financial intermediaries who float
bonds in international markets at a world-determined price q∗ (i.e. the inverse of the gross
world real interest rate, R∗ which is kept constant for simplicity). They use the resources
raised this way to fund purchases of the bonds that domestic agents issue in order to borrow. These intermediaries price domestic bonds according to this standard no-arbitrage
condition:
qtc

 c 
q∗ Et pt+1
.
=
ptc

(2.6)

The price of domestic bonds issued at date t has associated with it the ex-ante domestic real
c ≡ 1/qc =
interest rate in units of c given by Rt+1
t

R∗ ptc
.
c
Et [ pt+1
]

This is the rate at which domestic
 c 
bonds are contracted at date t, and the expected real exchange rate (Et pt+1
) is one of its
key determinants. Similarly, the ex-ante domestic real interest rate in units of tradables

T ≡ 1/(qc pc ), and it is also determined by the expected real exchange
is defined as Rt+1
t t
c ) determines
rate. In contrast, the value of the real exchange rate realized at t + 1 (pt+1
T ≡
the ex-post real interest rate paid in units of tradables, which is given by R̃t+1

with an associated implied price of q̃tT ≡

qtc ptc
c .
pt+1

c pc
Rt+1
t+1
ptc

As we show later, the difference between

these ex-ante and ex-post interest rates plays a central role in driving the effects of liability
dollarization.
Except for liability dollarization, this is a frictionless characterization of financial intermediation. Banks have unrestricted access to world capital markets, intermediation does
not incur any costs other than the funding cost R∗ , banks can pay negative dividends, and
can always cover a shortfall between income from loans paid by domestic agents and repayment to foreign creditors with additional external borrowing. These assumptions are
made so that we can isolate the effects of liability dollarization on the borrowers (i.e. the
nonfinancial private sector), which have not been considered in the Sudden Stops literature
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before, and they also simplify both the theoretical analysis and the numerical solution of
the model. On the other hand, modifying the model to add intermediaries exposed to financial distress because of liability dollarization is of course an important item for further
research.

2.2

Competitive Equilibrium & Comparison with Standard Models

The competitive equilibrium of the SSLD model is given by sequences of allocations
 N c c
c }
{ctT , ctN , bt+1
t≥0 , and prices pt , pt , qt t≥0 that solve the optimization problem of the

representative agent, satisfy the no-arbitrage condition of the financial intermediaries, and
satisfy also the market-clearing condition of the nontradables sector (ctN = yN ) and the rec + pc b ).
source constraint of the tradables sector (ctT = ytT − qtc ptc bt+1
t t

The equilibrium conditions are the following:

ptN

=



1−ω
ω



ctT
ctN

η +1



T
+ µt
uT (t) = β Et uT (t + 1)R̃t+1


c
qtc ptc bt+1
≥ −κ ytT + ptN yN ,

with equality if µt > 0,

(2.7)

(2.8)
(2.9)

 c 
qtc ptc = q∗ Et pt+1

(2.10)

ctN = yN

(2.11)

c
ctT = ytT − qtc ptc bt+1
+ ptc bt ,

(2.12)

where µt is the non-negative Lagrange multiplier on the credit constraint, and uT (t) ≡
u′ (ct )∂ ct /∂ ctT . Notice also two implications of these equilibrium conditions that will play
an important role in the analysis that follows: First, (2.3), (2.7) and (2.11) imply that at
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equilibrium the price of nontradables and the price of consumption are increasing functions
of tradables consumption, denoted pN (ctT ) and pc (ctT ) respectively. Second, if the credit
constraint binds, ctT is in fact independent of the value of µt and is given by the solutions
to the following nonlinear equation in ctT formed by conditions (2.7), (2.9) holding with
equality, (2.11) and (2.12):
ctT = (1 + κ )ytT + κ pN (ctT )yN + pc (ctT )btc.

(2.13)

2.2.1 Comparison with Standard SS Models
We compare the above equilibrium conditions with those pertaining to the standard model
of Sudden Stops in order to isolate the effects of liability dollarization.26 In particular,
since debt is non-state-contingent, liability dollarization introduces three key effects that
result from the fact that borrowers are affected by real-exchange-rate fluctuations that induce movements in ex-ante and ex-post real interest rates, and these effects are present
even without the collateral constraint (although their magnitude does change with credit
constraints).
1. Fluctuations in the debt repayment burden: At any date t, the burden of repaying
debt (btc < 0) contracted at t − 1 is ptc btc . Hence, variations in the realized real exchange rate alter the repayment burden. A real appreciation (depreciation) increases
(reduces) it, inducing non-insurable fluctuations in income disposable for tradables
consumption. This income effect can also be interpreted in terms of changes in the
ex-post real interest rate in units of tradables. A real appreciation (depreciation) increases (reduces) the burden of debt repayment because it increases (reduces) the
T in condition (2.8), the
26. The equilibrium conditions in the standard models differ in that R∗ replaces R̃t+1
c
c
c
c
c
∗
terms qt pt bt+1 and pt bt are replaced with q bt+1 and bt where bt are bonds in units of ctT , and condition
(2.10) is removed.
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ex-post real interest rate. Moreover, these fluctuations increase effective income
volatility and thus strengthen incentives for precautionary savings, which weaken
incentives to borrow.
2. Fluctuations in the price of new domestic debt: The intermediaries’ pricing condition
(2.6) implies that, for a given world interest rate, the price of newly-issued domestic
bonds in units of tradables qtc ptc rises when the real exchange rate is expected to
appreciate, which implies that the ex-ante domestic interest rate in units of tradables
T
c
Rt+1
falls. Since we are studying an economy with debt (bt+1
< 0), this fall in the

intertemporal relative price of ctT triggers income and substitution effects pushing for
debt to increase. The lower interest rate also weakens self-insurance incentives.
3. Risk-taking borrowing incentive: The marginal cost of borrowing faced by domestic
agents falls because of the positive co-movement between consumption and the real
exchange rate. This result is evident if we re-write the Euler equation for domestic
bonds as follows:
T
) + µt .
uT (t) = β R∗ Et [uT (t + 1)] + β Covt (uT (t + 1), R̃t+1

(2.14)

The marginal cost of borrowing in the right-hand-side of this expression differs
from the standard SS model with debt in units of tradables only because of the
T ). This term is negative because u (t + 1) is decreasterm β Covt (uT (t + 1), R̃t+1
T
T
ing in ct+1
and tradables consumption and the price of consumption are positively

correlated. Hence, the marginal cost of borrowing is lower than in the standard
T and pc
T
model. In fact, since ct+1
t+1 are perfectly correlated, Covt (uT (t + 1), R̃t+1 ) =
c )
−σt (uT (t+1))σt (pt+1
,
c
q∗ Et [pt+1 ]

c ) are conditional standard deviwhere σt (uT (t + 1)) and σt (pt+1

ations of marginal utility and the real exchange rate respectively. As a result, the
risk-taking borrowing incentive strengthens when tradables marginal utility is more
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σ (pc )

variable and/or the coefficient of variation of the real exchange rate ( Ett [pt+1
c ] ) rises.
t+1

This result also implies that, for given standard deviations of marginal utility and
prices, the risk-taking incentive weakens when the real exchange rate is expected to
appreciate. Hence, an expected real appreciation triggers opposing effects on borrowing incentives: It weakens the risk-taking incentive but strengthens the effect on
the price of new debt.
Because of these three effects, Sudden Stops will differ in magnitude and frequency
across SSLD and SS models with identical parameters, and they may occur at different
levels of debt and income. If the constraint binds in both models for a given value of ytT ,
however, allocations and prices will differ only due to differences in the repayment burden
of the outstanding debt. This is because, when the constraint binds, ctT is determined by the
non-linear equation (2.13), and this equation differs across the two models only because of
the debt repayment terms. Still, along the equilibrium path of each model, the magnitude
and frequency of Sudden Stops will differ depending on the outstanding debt (btc ) and
the size of income shocks (ytT ) needed to trigger the constraint in each economy. The
outstanding debt that triggers Sudden Stops is endogenous and depends on the history
of previous income shocks and optimal debt decisions, which differ in the two models
because of the three effects described above. Similarly, the frequency of Sudden Stops will
differ depending on the long-run probability with which each economy reaches states with
enough debt to trigger a Sudden Stop.
SS models also have the property that while they can support unique equilibria, so that
a particular sequence of income causes a shift from a unique unconstrained equilibrium
to a unique constrained one, they can also support equilibrium multiplicity, so that for a
given income level there can be both constrained and unconstrained equilibria and which
one prevails depends on a “sunspot” variable (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
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(2017, 2018)). Because multiplicity emerges due to the possibility of supporting more
than one equilibrium when the credit constraint binds, due to the responses of collateral
values and optimal debt choices, it is reasonable to expect that liability dollarization should
also lead to differences across the SS and SSLD models in the conditions required for
multiplicity and in the characteristics of multiple equilibria.
In the remainder of this Section, we compare the characteristics of Sudden Stops and
multiple equilibria in the two models in a perfect-foresight environment, in which the solutions of the models can be fully characterized analytically. For a comparison of quantitative
solutions of stochastic versions of the models see Mendoza and Rojas (2017).

2.2.2 Perfect Foresight Analysis
Under perfect foresight, ex-ante and ex-post real exchange rates and interest rates are the
same. As a result, the Euler equation and resource constraint of the SSLD model can be
rewritten as follows (assuming the standard no-Ponzi-game condition):
uT (t) = β R∗ [uT (t + 1)] + µt
∞

∑ R∗−t ctT =

t=0

(2.15)

∞

∑ R∗−t ytT + pc0 bc0,

(2.16)

t=0

∞
where ∑t=0
R∗−t ytT ≡ W0 is the tradables non-financial wealth of the economy. These two

conditions, together with (2.7), (2.9) and (2.11) characterize fully the SSLD equilibrium
under perfect foresight. Following Mendoza (2005), we simplify the analysis by assuming
that β R∗ = 1, bc0 < 0 (i.e. the economy starts with some debt), initial tradables income
is lower than in the future so that agents would want to set bc1 < 0, and we study wealthneutral shocks such that yT0 changes keeping W0 constant, hence inducing agents to borrow
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more.27 For a sufficiently large cut in yT0 , the collateral constraint binds, but for smaller
shocks it does not.
If the collateral constraint does not bind, and since β R∗ = 1, tradables consumption is
constant at the standard value of textbook models of consumption smoothing:
cT = (1 − β )(W0 + pc0 bc0 ).

(2.17)

It is straightforward to verify that the conditions that characterize the perfect-foresight equilibrium of the SS model are almost identical and yield an analogous solution for tradables
consumption, except for one difference: In the term that represents financial wealth in the
right-hand-side of (2.17), financial wealth is given by the term b0 in the SS model (with
bonds denominated in tradables), v. pc0 bc0 in the SSLD model. These two terms will differ in general, because for given values of the exogenous initial conditions bc0 and b0 , the
equilibrium value of the initial price pc0 determines whether the burden of repayment of
the initial debt is higher in the SSLD or the SS case. However, taking the equilibrium
price of nontradables pN,SS from an unconstrained solution of the SS model for a given b0 ,
we can compute the implied value of the consumption price index pc,SS and then define a
threshold initial debt level in the SSLD model such that b̃c0 ≡ b0 /pc,SS . At this debt level,
the SSLD and SS models yield identical unconstrained perfect-foresight equilibria because
both financial and nonfinancial wealth are the same.
If bc0 < b̃c0 , the SS model yields higher tradables consumption and prices than the SSLD
model.28 Consumption rises by less than the reduction in debt because the increase in pc
increases the debt repayment burden and hence offsets some of the effect of the lower debt.
27. A wealth-neutral income shock at t=0 is defined by income levels (yT0 , yT1 ) such that yT1 − ȳT = R(ȳT − yT0 )
and ytT = ȳT for t ≥ 2. Hence, wealth remains constant at W0 = ȳT /(1 − β ).
28. Similarly, keeping b̃c0 and b0 unchanged when making parametric changes that affect wealth (for example, temporary or permanent, unanticipated changes in the tradables income stream) results in different
equilibria that depend on the changes in initial prices and debt repayment burden.

62

Because of perfect foresight, the effects of liability dollarization operating via the price of
newly issued debt and the risk-taking incentive are ruled out. Only the effect operating via
the debt repayment burden is at work. Note that when bc0 > b̃c0 the results presented above
go in the opposite direction.
If the reduction in yT0 is sufficiently large to make the collateral constraint bind at t = 0,
a Sudden Stop occurs. Condition (2.12) implies that ctT falls, because access to debt to sustain tradables consumption is constrained. Then it follows from condition (2.7) that ptN falls
to clear the nontradables market. This generates a further tightening of the collateral constraint, because it reduces the value of collateral provided by the nontradables endowment
in condition (2.9). Formally, the date-0 allocations and prices are determined by condition
(2.13). This condition is again almost the same that determines tradables consumption in
a Sudden Stop in the SS model, except for the debt repayment term pc (cT0 )bc0 , which in
the SS model is just b0 . By the same argument as before, the Sudden Stop equilibrium
prices of the SS model could be used to set the exogenous value of bc0 so as to make the
SS and SSLD solutions when the constraint binds the same. But to compare Sudden Stops
across the two models, assume instead that the initial condition is set at the value b̃c0 , which
sustains identical unconstrained equilibria. In this case, the Sudden Stop equilibria of the
two economies differ.
(a) Sudden Stops with unique equilibria
Figure 2.1 illustrates the determination of equilibria in both models in the (cT , pN )
space for a scenario in which the equilibria are unique, in a manner analogous to Figure 2
in Mendoza (2005). The PP curve is the marginal rate of substitution in consumption of
tradables and nontradables, which given isoelastic preferences and the constant endowment
of nontradables yields a convex function that maps cT into pN (this curve is the same in the
SS and SSLD models). The various BB curves show the value of pN that corresponds to a
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value of cT such that the collateral constraint holds with equality and the tradables resource
T
constraint is satisfied (i.e. equation (2.13) solved for pN
0 as a function of c0 ), for the SS

and SSLD models and for each under different values of yT0 . In each case, equilibrium is
reached where the PP curve and the relevant BB curve intersect.
Figure 2.1: Sudden Stops under Perfect Foresight: Unique Equilibria

Mendoza (2005) showed that in the SS model, the BBSS curves are increasing, linear
functions of cT0 with an horizontal intercept given by I SS ≡ (1 + κ )yT0 + b0 and a slope of
mSS ≡ 1/(κ yN ). For the SSLD model, we show in the Appendix that the BBSSLD curves
are also increasing in cT0 with an horizontal intercept given by I SSLD ≡ (1 + κ )yT0 + ω 1/η b̃c0
and a slope of mSSLD ≡ [1 − pc′ (t)b̃c0]/(κ yN ).29 Notice that again the difference between
the SS and SSLD models is due to differences in the repayment burden of the initial debt.
The term ω 1/η in the intercept of the SSLD model is the lower bound of pc that is reached
29. As shown in the Appendix, the BBSSLD curves are concave if the elasticity of substitution between cT and
cN is greater or equal to 1, convex if it is less or equal than 1/2, and switch from concave to convex as cT
rises if the elasticity is between 1/2 and 1. Under reasonable parameter values for emerging markets and
any elasticity between 0 and 1, however, BBSSLD is either strictly convex or nearly linear with a slightly
concave segment for very low cT .
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when pN = 0. Since at b̃c0 we have the same debt in units of tradables in the SS and SSLD
models at the higher prices supported in the unconstrained equilibrium, the intercept of the
SSLD model must be to the right of the one in the SS model (since the same debt is valued
at the minimum price in the intercept of the SSLD model).
The BBSS,0 , BBSSLD,0 curves are for a threshold income level ŷT0 such that with a
wealth-neutral shock that reduces date-0 income that much, the credit constraint allows
for just enough debt to still support the unconstrained equilibrium (i.e. below this threshold
the constrain becomes binding).30 Hence, by construction (and again assuming the initial
SSLD debt is b̃c0 ) these two BB curves intersect PP at point A and yield the same equilibrium values of cT and pN in the two models. The BBSS,1 , BBSSLD,1 curves are for yT0 < ŷT0 ,
which shifts the BB curves to the left, triggering the credit constraint and causing a Sudden
Stop.
The main point of Figure 2.1 is to show that, when equilibria are unique, Sudden Stops
under perfect foresight are milder in the SSLD model. The Sudden Stop equilibria are
reached at points B and C for the SSLD and SS model respectively.31 Since the BBSSLD,1
curve is always steeper than the BBSS,1 curve and has a higher horizontal intercept, and
since for given yT0 the two curves always intersect at point A, BBSSLD,1 must cut the PP
curve to the right of where BBSS,1 cuts it.32 This implies that in the Sudden Stop of the
SSLD economy, tradables consumption and relative prices are higher than in the SS economy. Both equilibria are Sudden Stops, because financial amplification via the deflation of

c̄T − p̄c b̃c −κ p̄N ȳN

0
30. The threshold income in the SSLD model is ŷT0 =
, where c̄T , p̄c and p̄N are the uncon1+κ
strained equilibrium allocations and prices.
31. The Figure shows the values of cT0 , pN0 such that the budget and credit constraints hold with equality and
pN0 equals the corresponding marginal rate of substitution. It is also straightforward to show that the
Euler equation holds with a Lagrange multiplier of µ0 = u′ (cT0 ) − u′ (cT1 ) > 0 and that µt = 0 for t ≥ 1.
In the SS model, since W0 is unchanged, yT1 > ȳT > yT0 , and ytT = ȳT for t ≥ 2, it follows that the fact
that cT0 < c̄T implies cT1 > c̄T . Moreover, ctT = cT1 for t ≥ 2. This, together with yT1 > ȳT , implies that
b2 > b1 > −κ (yT1 + pN1 yN ) and bt = b2 for t ≥ 2.
32. The fact that pc′ (t)b̃c0 < 0 implies that mSSLD > mSS , and the fact that ω 1/η b̃c0 < b0 implies that I SSLD > I SS .
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the value of collateral causes a sudden drop from the unconstrained stationary consumption
and prices at point A, but the drops in the SSLD model are always milder. The intuition is
simple: In the SSLD economy, the fall in the real exchange rate associated with a Sudden
Stop reduces pc0 , and hence the burden of repaying b̃c0 in terms of tradable goods falls, providing additional resources for consumption of tradables. Notice that around point A the
BB curves are steeper than the PP curve, which as we show below is a sufficient condition
for the equilibria to be unique.
It is also worth noting that there could be a second intersection of the BB and PP curves
in Figure 1 if we extended its domain far enough. The second intersection, however, is
not an equilibrium. This is because, as is evident from the Figure, cT0 would be higher
than c̄T , and given the specification of the wealth-neutral shock the intertemporal resource
constraint would imply cT1 < cT0 , which would imply a negative Lagrange multiplier (µ0 =
u′ (cT0 ) − u′ (cT1 ) < 0). Moreover, the unconstrained equilibrium cannot co-exist with the
unique Sudden Stops equilibria, because as Figure 1 shows, the value of pN
0 at which the
nontradables market would clear if tradables consumption is c̄T is too low for the resource
constraint to be satisfied with the credit constraint binding (i.e. at c̄T the PP curve is below
the BBSS,1 and BBSSLD,1 curves).
(a) Sudden Stops with multiple equilibria
Figure 2.2 illustrates the equilibrium of both models when there are multiple equilibria.
Intuitively, multiplicity can emerge if the parameters of the PP and BB curves are such
that the curves intersect twice for cT ≤ c̄T . BB curves that are flatter than the PP curve
around point A are necessary (but not sufficient) for this to happen. In the Figure, the
BB curves for ŷT0 are constructed in the same way as the BBSSLD,0 and BBSS,0 curves of
the previous Figure: They correspond to a wealth-neutral reduction in yT0 such that the
credit constraint is marginally binding (i.e. it sustains the same amount of debt as in the
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replacements
unconstrained equilibrium) assuming again that the initial debt of the SSLD economy is
set at b̃c0 . Hence, point A has the same meaning as before. It shows the unconstrained
stationary equilibrium that is identical in the SSLD and SS economies. What has changed
is the curvature and slope of the PP and BB curves, and in particular the BB curves are
significantly flatter. As a result, at an initial income of ŷT0 , the SS and SSLD economies
now have two equilibrium solutions each: The unconstrained outcome at point A and the
Sudden Stop outcomes (points B and C for the SS and SSLD economy respectively).
Figure 2.2: Multiple Equilibria under Perfect Foresight

Note, however, that BB curves flatter than the PP curve around point A are not sufficient
for equilibrium multiplicity, because this also depends on the value of yT0 . In Figure 2,
for yT0 < ŷT0 , the BB curves would shift left and only one Sudden Stop equilibria would
survive in each economy (the unconstrained equilibrium is no longer attainable, just as in
Figure 1). When yT0 = ŷT0 , we have the two equilibria as explained above. For yT0 > ŷT0 ,
the BB curves shift to the right and three equilibria exist, because there would be two
intersections with PP to the left of A, plus the unconstrained equilibrium is also attainable
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since income exceeds ŷT0 .33 In contrast, when the BB curves are steeper than PP at point
A, the unconstrained equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for any income higher than ŷT0 .
As yT0 continues to rise, however, yT0 reaches another threshold value ỹT0 , different in the
two models, at which once again the unconstrained equilibrium and only one Sudden Stop
equilibrium are possible (see Figure 2.2), and for yT0 > ỹT0 multiplicity disappears and only
the unconstrained equilibrium survives, because the BB curves shift to the right enough to
never intersect with PP.34
It follows from the above discussion that equilibrium multiplicity requires: (i) BB
curves flatter than PP around point A, and (ii) wealth-neutral income shocks in the specific
interval ŷT0 ≤ yT0 ≤ ỹT0 . As we explain next, equilibrium multiplicity is harder to obtain in
the SSLD model because, for the same parameter values and initial conditions, multiplicity
requires higher values of κ and narrower income intervals.
Condition (i) can be formalized as follows: A BB curve steeper than the PP curve
around cT is a sufficient condition for a unique equilibrium when a Sudden Stop occurs.
(1+η )ptN
, which
ctT
N
(1+η ) p̄
. Consider
c̄T

Since the PP curve is given by condition (2.7), its slope can be expressed as
at the common unconstrained equilibrium of the two models equals

next the slope of the BB curve in the SS model, which is 1/(κ yN ). It follows from equating
these two slopes that the threshold value of κ that guarantees a unique equilibrium in the
SS model is κ̂ SS =

cT
.
(1+η )pN yN

Any κ lower than this implies that Sudden Stop equilibria

for any yT0 ≤ ŷT0 are unique. This condition is the same one derived in Mendoza (2005).
The slope of BB in the SSLD model is

c
1−pc′
0 b0
,
N
κy

and hence the threshold value of κ for

uniqueness of Sudden Stop equilibria under liability dollarization is κ̂ SSLD =

c̄T (1− p̄c′ bc0 )
.
(1+η ) p̄N yN

33. In all the Sudden Stops equilibria of Figure 2, cT0 < c¯T < cT1 and the Euler equation holds with a Lagrange
multiplier µ0 = u′ (cT0 ) − u′ (cT1 ) > 0. This is again because, given constant wealth, the intertemporal
resource constraint implies that cT1 rises as the credit constraint makes cT0 fall.
34. ỹT is the income level that makes the BB curves tangent to the PP curve, which is different for the two
models.
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However, since we are assuming that the initial debt of the SSLD model is the value b̃c0 that
supports the same unconstrained equilibria in both models, it follows that κ̂ SSLD = κ̂ SS (1 −


p̄c b̃c
p̄c′ b̃c0 ) = κ SS 1 − ξ pc ,cT c̄T 0 , where ξ pc ,cT is the elasticity of the CES price index with

respect to tradables consumption, and is given by ξ pc ,cT =
since b̃c0 < 0 and ξ pc ,cT > 0 because

1+η

ω
1−ω

1

−

η

. Hence,

1+(
) 1+η (pN ) 1+η
p̄c′ > 0, we obtain that κ̂ SSLD > κ̂ SS . Thus, for identical

parameters and the same initial conditions, multiplicity is harder to find in the SSLD model
because it maintains uniqueness at higher values of κ (i.e. the range of values of κ for which
Sudden Stop equilibria are unique is larger in the SSLD model). Moreover, κ̂ SSLD exceeds

κ̂ SS by a percentage given by the absolute value of ξ pc ,cT

p̄c b̃c0
,
c̄T

which in turn depends on

preference parameters and the values of W0 , yT0 and b̃c0 .
If κ ≥ κ̂ SSLD > κ̂ SS , it is possible to have multiple equilibria in both models, but as
we explained earlier, this is only a necessary condition. Multiplicity needs also condition
(ii) requiring tradables income to be in the interval [ŷT0 , ỹT0 ], where as noted above ỹT0 is
different in the SS and SSLD models, while ŷT0 is the same (because of the assumption
that the initial debt of the SSLD model is b̃c0 ). Hence, assuming that κ is high enough
to support multiplicity, the difference in the width of this interval across the two models
indicates the extent to which multiplicity is easier or harder to obtain in one model v.
the other. A wider (narrower) interval for the SSLD model suggests that multiplicity is
easier (harder) to obtain, although the deterministic nature of the analysis does not take
into account the probability of tradables income falling into a particular interval. Visually,
Figure 2.2 suggests that the multiplicity interval of tradables income is narrower for the
SSLD model, but this is easier to illustrate with quantitative examples, as we show below.
In the case of the SS model, the above analysis of equilibrium multiplicity has an equivalent formulation in terms of the analysis conducted by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018).
They derived the same condition on a threshold value of κ required for multiplicity, and
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showed that multiplicity requires in addition that the initial bond holdings are within an interval of relatively high values (i.e. multiplicity requires relative low initial debt). The value
of b0 (for b0 < 0) must be high enough so that at the unconstrained equilibrium the threshold condition on κ holds, but not so high that the credit constraint does not bind at date 0
(since higher b0 implies also higher b1 at the unconstrained equilibrium). Intuitively, the
consistency of the two approaches follows from noticing that parametric differences in b0
keeping yT0 constant can be alternatively represented as parametric differences in yT0 keeping b0 constant by capitalizing initial income differences into changes in bond holdings.
Hence, an interval of relatively high b0 (i.e. low debt) that sustains multiplicity translates
into an interval of relatively high income values. We used the latter approach here because
it allows us to make Sudden Stop outcomes in the SS and SSLD models comparable by
keeping the initial debt set at the value such that the unconstrained equilibria are the same.

2.2.3 Quantitative Examples
We examine next the results of quantitative examples that illustrate the main theoretical
findings we have presented. In particular, we illustrate the characteristics of Sudden Stops
in the SSLD economy, compare Sudden Stops between the SS and SSLD models when Sudden Stop equilibria are unique, and show that multiplicity is harder to obtain in the SSLD
model. We set parameter values following the calibration proposed by Bianchi (2011),
which was designed to match properties in annual data for Argentina. Since we solve for
perfect-foresight equilibria, we ignore the parts of his calibration that relate to the stochastic processes of tradables and nontradables income, and set ȳN = 1 for all t and ytT = 1 for
t > 0. Table 2.1 lists the parameter values.
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Table 2.1: Parameters
Parameter
γ
η
ω
β ,q∗
yN

Value
2
0.205
0.31
0.91
1.00

Bianchi (2011) set the coefficient of relative risk aversion to γ = 2, a standard value
in DSGE models. He also set η = 0.205, so that the elasticity of substitution between
tradables and nontradables (1/(1 + η )) is 0.83, which is the upper bound of a range of
existing estimates. This elasticity is key for determining the elasticities of both pc and pN
to changes in sectoral consumption allocations, which play a central role in determining the
effects of Sudden Stops and the magnitude of the externalities driving the design of optimal
financial policy, as we show in the next Section. ω = 0.31 is set so as to match a tradables
consumption share of 32 percent. Bianchi also set the discount factor to β = 0.91, so that
his stochastic SS model can match Argentina’s average net foreign asset position-GDP ratio
of −0.29 from the data constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). We take this same
value of β and since we are assuming β R∗ = 1 this implies q∗ = 1/R∗ = β .
Given the above parameter values, and ytT = 1 for all t, we solve for the unconstrained
equilibrium of the SS model for a value of b0 such that the initial net foreign asset positionGDP ratio (b0 /(yT0 + p̄N ȳN )) matches Argentina’s average, which implies b0 = −0.868.
Then, using the value of the consumption price index at this equilibrium, pc,SS , we solve
for b̃c0 = b0 /pc,SS , which is the initial condition for bonds in the SSLD model that supports
the same unconstrained stationary equilibrium as the calibrated SS model. This guarantees
that the initial net foreign asset position-GDP ratio of the SSLD model, which is given by
pc0 b̃c0 /(yT0 + p̄N yN ), is also -0.29.
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Consider next the wealth-neutral shocks to yT0 (which assume future tradables income
changes as needed to keep W0 unchanged). As yT0 falls agents borrow more (bond holdings
fall) at t = 0 in order to maintain the same unconstrained consumption stream. For a given
value of κ , this new debt choice approaches the maximum allowed by the credit constraint
N
(−κ [yT0 + pN
0 ȳ ]) as initial income falls. As long as the constraint does not bind, the SS and

SSLD economies stay at the unconstrained equilibrium, but when it binds the allocations
and prices at date 0 move to a Sudden Stop equilibrium, which may or may not be unique
as we showed earlier.
We study first the case in which Sudden Stop equilibria are unique in both economies.
To this end, we set κ = 0.29 and solve for the equilibria of the two models for wealthneutral income shocks in the interval (0.85,1). Figure 2.3 presents the results for the SSLD
economy as percent deviations from the unconstrained equilibrium, and shows also results
for a hypothetical scenario in which pc and pN are kept fixed at the unconstrained levels.
When income is sufficiently high (for yT0 near 1), the credit constraint does not bind and
therefore the plots show zero deviations from the unconstrained equilibrium. As yT0 falls
the constraint becomes binding triggering Sudden Stops, and the plots show that aggregate
and tradables consumption, as well as the price of nontradables and the real exchange rate,
display sizable declines. For example, for a 5 percent shock (yT0 = 0.95), c0 and cT0 fall by
c
2 and 6.3 percent respectively, and pN
0 and p0 fall by 7.6 and 5.3 percent respectively, bond

holdings in units of tradables rise 580 basis points and there is a current account reversal of
45 basis points.
The comparison of Sudden Stops vis-a-vis the scenario with constant prices helps illustrate the extent to which the Fisherian deflation effect from the credit constraint (reducing
cT0 ) and the debt-repayment-burden effect from liability dollarization (increasing cT0 ) offset
each other. Keeping prices constant removes both effects, so that the declines in con-
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sumption that result are driven only by the exogenous drop in income and the fall in the
exogenous component of borrowing capacity (κ yT0 ), which are at work in both scenarios.
Hence, if the two effects were of equal magnitude (in absolute value), the results for the
SSLD case and the smooth prices case would be identical. The fact that the latter yields
slightly larger Sudden Stops indicates that in the results for the SSLD economy the deflation and repayment-burden effects nearly offset each other, but the latter is slightly larger
(in absolute value). Hence, through the debt-repayment-burden effect, liability dollarization is providing a very good hedge against the loss of resources caused by the endogenous
N
component of borrowing capacity (κ pN
0 ȳ ). This result may not hold for different param-

eterizations, and it will also fail more generally in stochastic SSLD models in which the
new-debt-price and risk-taking incentive are also at work.
Figure 2.4 compares Sudden Stop equilibria between the SSLD and SS economies for
yT0 = 0.97 (a 3 percent shock) for values of κ in the (0.21,0.303) interval. Recall that both
models have identical parameters and identical initial conditions, and hence the unconstrained solutions are identical.
In line with the theoretical results derived earlier, the SSLD model always produces
milder Sudden Stops, because of the debt-repayment-burden effect. For the upper bound
of κ , the credit constraint does not bind, and hence both economies remain at the unconstrained equilibrium, which is identical between the two. As κ decreases and borrowing
capacity tightens, both economies move to unique Sudden Stop equilibria, but as the plots
illustrate, the Sudden Stops of the SSLD economy are significantly smaller. For a drop
in the debt-to-income limit of 5 percentage points, reducing κ from 0.3 to 0.25, the SS
(SSLD) model produces declines in c0 and cT0 of 18 and 45 (4.7 and 14) percent respecc
tively, and drops in pN
0 and p0 of 51.7 and 38.7 (16.6 and 11.7) percent respectively. The

current account rises by 20 percentage points of GDP in the SS model, compared with 4.1
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Figure 2.3: Sudden Stops in Response to Income Shocks in the SSLD Model
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in the SSLD model.35 The collapse in the real exchange rate (pc0 ) moderates the Sud35. Mendoza and Rojas (2017) show that the finding that Sudden Stops are milder extends to quantitative
comparisons of stochastic SS and SSLD models, in which the debt-price and risk-taking effects of liability
dollarization are present, and that for the same calibration the SSLD model performs better at matching
the observed empirical regularities of Sudden Stops.
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Figure 2.4: Sudden Stops in Response to Changes in κ in the SS and SSLD Models
Tradables Consumption (cT )
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den Stops of the SSLD economy significantly, whereas in the SS economy its even larger
collapse does not affect the debt repayment burden. Notice also that the gap between
the equilibrium responses in both models widens as κ decreases, indicating that the debt-
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repayment-burden effect works as an endogenous hedge that partially weakens Sudden
Stops and by larger amounts for larger corrections in borrowing capacity.
Consider next the case of equilibrium multiplicity. Using the same parameter values as
in the previous experiments, the threshold values of κ that are necessary (but not sufficient)
for multiple equilibria in each model are κ SS = 0.38 and κ SSLD = 0.68. Moreover, the factor
by which the latter exceeds the former is 1 − ξ pc ,cT

p̄c b̃c0
c̄T

= 1.79. Hence, the SSLD continues

to yield unique Sudden Stop equilibria at κ values up to roughly 1.8 times the threshold
value of the SS model. Thus, the liability dollarization model requires significantly higher

κ values to produce multiplicity.
As explained earlier, in addition to κ ≥ κ̂ , multiplicity requires income shocks to be
within a particular range. Under the calibrated parameter values we proposed, however,
the required income intervals do not intersect and hence multiplicity cannot be generated
in both the SS and SSLD models simultaneously. Hence, in order to produce Sudden Stop
outcomes with multiplicity we altered the model’s parameters. We lowered the elasticity
of substitution between cT and cN to 0.285 (η = 2.5), which is much lower than the range
from literature estimates cited by Bianchi (2011), and halved the initial debt position (i.e.
bc0 = −0.149). With these parameter changes and setting κ = 0.45 we can support multiple
equilibria in both models, as shown in Figure 2.5.
This Figure shows the equilibrium determination of the SS and SSLD models in our
quantitative examples for two values of initial income, the threshold value ŷT0 at which
the credit constraint sustains just enough debt to support the unconstrained equilibrium,
and the upper bound ỹT0 above which the only equilibrium the models can support is the
unconstrained equilibrium. For each case, the Figure shows the corresponding BB curves
of the SS and SSLD models, as well as the PP curve. As explained earlier, when income
equals either ŷT0 or ỹT0 the models support two equilibria, the unconstrained equilibrium and
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one Sudden Stop equilibrium, and for income levels inside this interval the models support
three equilibria, the unconstrained one and two Sudden Stop ones. The value of ŷT0 (0.397)
is the same for the two models because we solve them with identical parameters and initial
conditions. The values of ỹT0 are different because of the effects of liability dollarization,
and they are ỹT,SS = 0.627, and ỹT,SSLD = 0.463 for the SS and SSLD model respectively.
Hence, the range of income in which multiple equilibria exist under this calibration is much
narrower in the SSLD model than in the SS model (about 1/3rd the size, 0.07 v. 0.23).
Moreover, as noted earlier, multiplicity occurs when tradables income is “relatively high,”
in the sense of being (weakly) higher than the income level at which the credit constraint
is only marginally binding. Hence, Sudden Stops triggered by multiplicity coincide with
high income.
Figure 2.5: Multiple Equilibria in the SS and SSLD Models
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The difficulty in generating multiplicity with the SSLD model can be illustrated further
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by studying an alternative numerical example calibrated to match the scenario with multiplicity in the SS model studied in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2018). Their calibration sets

η = 1, which implies an elasticity of substitution of 0.5, still inside the range of empirical
estimates but closer to the lower bound than in our baseline calibration, and ω = 0.26 (v.
0.31 in our experiments). Using the same initial debt we used here, these parameter values
imply threshold values for κ of κ SS = 0.192 and κ SSLD = 0.456. Hence, at their calibrated
value of κ = 0.3, there is multiplicity in the SS model, in line with their findings, but not in
the SSLD model. Under liability dollarization, κ would need to be nearly 2.4 times larger
than the threshold of the SS economy, or 1.5 times their calibrated value, in order to be in
the region in which multiplicity is possible.

2.3

Normative Analysis

In this Section, we study the normative implications of introducing liability dollarization
in Sudden Stops models, focusing on unique equilibria for simplicity. Following Bianchi
and Mendoza (2017), we characterize optimal financial policy following a primal approach
by analyzing the allocations attainable to a social planner who chooses the debt of private agents under commitment subject to the resource, market-clearing, and collateral constraints, and letting goods markets and financial intermediaries operate competitively.36 We
then explore the implications of this optimal policy for the design of domestic credit regulation (i.e. domestic debt taxes) v. capital controls. As we show below, the optimal policy
is time-inconsistent, because of the planner’s ability to affect the ex-ante domestic interest
rate for debt contracted at date t (or the expected real exchange rate) with the consumption
of tradable goods planned for date t + 1. Moreover, capital controls and debt taxes are
equivalent, so under the optimal policy the SSLD model does not support the use of capital
36. The last assumption is equivalent to assuming that the planner cannot contract debt directly with foreign
lenders in units of tradables, and instead borrows from the same intermediaries as private agents.
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controls as a policy aimed at discriminating external v. domestic credit. Finally, since the
optimal policy lacks credibility and follows a complex, nonlinear schedule, we study quantitatively the effectiveness of a simpler policy that sets time-invariant tax rates on domestic
credit and capital inflows in a stochastic, infinite-horizon environment.

2.3.1 Optimal Policy under Commitment
Assuming that the regulator chooses bond holdings for private agents, their optimization
problem reduces to a simple static problem of choosing tradables and nontradables consumption subject to a budget constraint that includes the income from tradables and nontradables, and a lump-sum transfer (tax) from the planner that represents the amount of rec
sources generated by borrowing (repaying). The private sector no longer chooses bt+1
and

does not face the collateral constraint. Hence, the first-order conditions of the agents’ optimization problem no longer include the Euler equation for bonds (equation (2.8)) and the
borrowing constraint (equation (2.9)), but the optimality condition for sectoral consumption allocation (equation (2.7)) still holds, since the market for nontradables still clears
competitively. In addition, the no-arbitrage condition of financial intermediaries must also
hold, because these intermediaries are also still operating competitively.
Using the nontradables market-clearing condition to substitute for ctN and the intermediaries’ no-arbitrage condition to substitute for qtc ptc , the social planner’s problem can be
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written as follows:37
∞

max E0 ∑ β t u(ct (ctT , yN ))

c }
{ctT ,bt+1

(2.18)

t=0

s.t.

 c
T
q∗ Et pc (ct+1
) bt+1
+ ctT = pc (ctT )btc + ytT ∀t

 c
T
q∗ Et pc (ct+1
) bt+1
≥ −κ (ytT + pN (ctT )yN ) ∀t.

(2.19)
(2.20)

It is important to note that in this problem, as was the case in the competitive equilibrium,
ctT is independent of the value of µt when the constraint binds, and is determined by the
same non-linear equation (2.13), which in this case follows from combining conditions
(2.19) and (2.20).
As we show below, the solution to the above problem displays time-inconsistency. The
key feature of the problem behind this result is that in the planner’s resource and borrow

T ) ) affects disposable
ing constraints, the real exchange rate expected for t + 1 (Et pc (ct+1
resources and borrowing capacity at date t. As a result, the planner’s optimal plans for a
given future date affect consumption allocations and borrowing capacity in the past.
The time-inconsistency result can be derived fomally by simplifying the planner’s Euler
equation for bonds to reduce it to the following expression:38

λt =



c
t−1 (λt ,p (t))
uT (t) + µt κ pN′ (t)yN − pc′ (t)btc Et−1 [λt ] + Cov
E [pc (t)]
t−1

1 − pc′ (t)btc

.

(2.21)

The planner’s marginal utility of wealth at date t (λt ) depends on two terms determined
37. The planner’s problem is written in short notation for simplicity. Given the Markov process of ytT , the
expectations are taken over histories of realizations, with the date-t probability of a history yTt denoted
c (yTt ) reby πt (yTt ) and the associated consumption and bonds allocations denoted by ctT (yTt ) and bt+1
spectively.
38. See Mendoza and Rojas (2017) for full details.
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at t − 1. First, Et−1 (λt ), which reflects the effect of changes in the amount of resources
generated by debt contracted at t − 1 on the marginal utility of wealth expected for date
t. This is possible because, by affecting real exchange rate expectations, the planner alters
c
qt−1
and hence the amount of tradable goods that a given amount of debt issued at t − 1

yields. Second, Covt−1 (λt , pc (t))/Et−1 [pc (t)], which has a similar form as the private
risk-taking incentive identified earlier in condition (2.14), except the planner’s covariance
is with respect to the social marginal utility of wealth one period ahead, instead of the
marginal utility of tradables consumption. The private risk-taking incentive reduces the
expected marginal cost of borrowing between t and t +1. The planner, in contrast, considers
how the covariance term alters the debt chosen at t − 1 and thereby the debt repayment
burden of date t. Through these two feedback effects, the planner’s choice of consumption
and debt at t affects price expectations and the planner’s covariance term at date t − 1,
which in turn alter λt by affecting the debt chosen at t − 1 and hence the burden of debt
repayment at date t.
These feedback effects produce time-inconsistency because, as of a given date t, the
planner has the incentive to pledge higher consumption at t + 1, so that a higher expected
real exchange rate props up qtc and reduces the ex-ante real interest rate, strengthening borrowing incentives and borrowing capacity via the effects of liability dollarization discussed
earlier. Ex-post, however, delivering on this pledge is suboptimal, because higher prices at
t + 1 imply a higher ex-post real interest rate, and thus a higher burden of debt repayment
in that period. This time-inconsistency mechanism is at work regardless of whether the
constraint binds or not, but it interacts with the constraint because by affecting borrowing
incentives it affects the likelihood that the constraint can bind at equilibrium.39
Bianchi and Mendoza (2017) obtained a similar result showing the time-inconsistency
T
could make the constraint less tight by increasing the
39. Notice that, when µt > 0, pledging higher ct+1
price of bonds, but this does not generate additional resources for consumption, which are still be given
by −κ (ytT + ptN ȳN ).
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of optimal macroprudential policy under commitment in a model in which assets serve as
collateral, but the mechanism driving the time-inconsistency that we described above is
different. In Bianchi and Mendoza, the asset-pricing condition connecting current asset
prices to future consumption leads the planner to prop up asset prices when the collateral
constraint binds by pledging lower future consumption, which is not optimal to do ex-post.
In contrast, in this model (and also in the SS model), since ptN and ctT are independent of
the planner’s future plans when the constraint binds at t, the planner cannot prop up the
value of collateral with its future plans.
It is important to notice that time-inconsistency emerges here even though the collateral constraint is defined in terms of a limit on the debt-to-income ratio (a flow constraint),
instead of a debt-to-assets ratio (a stock constraint, as in Bianchi and Mendoza (2017)).
Hence, time-inconsistency of optimal financial policy under commitment can exist in Fisherian models with either stock or flow collateral constraints. What is necessary is to have a
vehicle that allows the planner to affect past prices and allocations, or borrowing capacity,
with current consumption and debt choices. In contrast, optimal policy is time-consistent
in standard SS models, because there is no vehicle for this to happen.
The planner’s first-order conditions can be re-arranged to produce an alternative expression for the planner’s Euler equation for bonds that equates the social marginal costs
and benefits of borrowing, which is useful for characterizing the inefficiencies affecting the
competitive equilibrium. As shown in Mendoza and Rojas (2017), the resulting expression
is:

uT (t) = β Et


 T

uT (t + 1) + µt+1 κ yN pN′ (t + 1) R̃t+1
Ψ(t + 1)


+ µt ψ (t) − κ yN pN′ (t) ,
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(2.22)

where:
Ψ(t + 1) ≡

ψ (t) ≡ 1 − p

c′

(t)btc + pc′ (t)btc





ψ (t)
ψ (t + 1)




Et−1 [λt ] Covt−1 (λt , pc (t))
+
.
λt
λt Et−1 [pc (t)]

(2.23)
(2.24)

The comparable Euler equation in the competitive equilibrium is:
 T

uT (t) = β Et R̃t+1
uT (t + 1) + µtCE ,

(2.25)

where µtCE denotes the multiplier of the collateral constraint in the competitive equilibrium.
Consider first the last terms in the right-hand-side of both Euler equations, which include the multipliers µt and µtCE . These terms are only present if the collateral constraint
binds at date t, but in this case the specific values of the multipliers are irrelevant for the
planner’s allocations, because, as we noted earlier, ctT is independent of µt and µtCE when
credit is constrained. Note, however, that allocations and prices will differ for the planner
and the unregulated equilibrium, because by internalizing the externalities the planner will
alter the likelihood of the constraint becoming binding and will generally arrive at states in
which the constraint binds with different btc .
Compare now the first terms in the right-hand-sides of the above Euler equations. These
T u (t + 1) is part of both the social and private marginal
terms indicate that the product R̃t+1
T

costs of borrowing, but the social marginal cost includes other terms that reflect the effect
of the pecuniary externalities at work in the model. The term µt+1 κ pN′ (t + 1)yN is familiar
from the standard SS models. It captures the macroprudential externality operating via the
effect of the price of nontradables (i.e. the value of collateral) on borrowing capacity, and is
strictly positive whenever states with µt+1 > 0 have positive probability at t + 1 as of date
t, because pN is increasing in cT . In states in which the collateral constraint is expected
to bind, the social marginal cost of borrowing includes the shadow value of the loss in
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borrowing capacity caused by the fall in the price of nontradables if a Sudden Stop occurs,
because the planner internalizes how the debt chosen at t affects the size of the price drop
at t + 1. Hence, this macroprudential externality is an overborrowing externality, since
it implies that the marginal cost of borrowing for private agents is lower than the social
marginal cost.
The term Ψ(t + 1) captures a second pecuniary externality that is particular to the
SSLD model, namely the intermediation externality. As the planner’s Euler equation show,
Ψ(t + 1) distorts the ex-post real interest rate paid in units of tradables. In turn, Ψ(t + 1) is
a ratio composed of the intermediation externality’s effects operating via the three mechanisms discussed earlier (repayment debt burden, price of newly issued debt, and risk-taking
incentive) at date t relative to t + 1, which are summarized in the terms ψ (t) and ψ (t + 1)
respectively. Using the expression that defines ψ (t), it follows that the effect operating via
the debt repayment burden is captured by the term 1 − pc′ (t)btc, which is strictly greater
than 1 because btc < 0 and pc′ (t) > 0. The planner internalizes that additional borrowing
at date t increases pc (t), which increases the burden of repaying outstanding debt. The
effects operating via the price of new debt and the risk-taking incentive are captured by the
h
i
c
pc′ (t)bc
t−1 (λt ,p (t))
. This term reflects the fact that the planner interterm λt t Et−1 (λt ) + Cov
E [pc (t)]
t−1

nalizes the intermediaries’ no-arbitrage condition, and hence takes into account how the
social marginal cost of borrowing responds to the effect of changes in date-t consumption
on price expectations, the price of debt and incentives to borrow at t − 1. In particular,
the planner takes into account how these effects alter the amount of resources in units of
tradables that debt contracted at t − 1 generates and the social valuation of the risk-taking
incentive at t − 1.
If Ψ(t + 1) is greater (smaller) than 1, the intermediation externality increases (reduces)
the social marginal cost of borrowing relative to the private marginal cost of borrowing, and
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hence it operates as an overborrowing (underborrowing) externality. Unfortunately, while
it is possible to show that ψ (t) > 0 (see Mendoza and Rojas (2017)), the size of Ψ(t + 1)
cannot be determined unambiguously. Using condition (2.24), however, we can infer that,
everything else constant, Ψ(t + 1) is greater (smaller) than 1 if the outstanding debt in
period t is larger (smaller) than in period t + 1, and/or if the incentives to borrow at t − 1
are weaker (stronger) than at t (i.e. if the planner’s real-exchange-rate expectations at t for
t + 1 exceed those at t − 1 for t). Under these conditions, the intermediation externality
operates as a second overborrowing (underborrowing) externality. Moreover, unlike the
macroprudential externality that is only present when µt+1 > 0 has positive probability
as of date t, the intermediation externality is always present, regardless of whether the
constraint is expected to bind or not (although the actual value of Ψ(t + 1) does depend on
whether the constraint is expected to bind).
It is worth noting that the intermediation externality vanishes if we assume either complete asset markets or perfect foresight. Under perfect foresight, the covariance term in
condition (2.24) vanishes and since Et−1 [λt ] = λt , it follows that ψ (t) = 1 for all t and
hence Ψ(t) = 1.40 The same happens under complete markets because λt becomes timeand state-invariant.
In order to decentralize the planner’s allocations as a competitive equilibrium, we consider possibly using two policy instruments: Capital controls (i.e. taxes on the intermediaries’ inflows of foreign capital) and domestic debt taxes (taxes on domestic borrowing).
Capital controls are modeled as a tax θt that raises the interest rate at which intermediaries
borrow from abroad above R∗ (i.e. it lowers the price of bonds sold abroad below q∗ ). With

40. One effect of the intermediation externality does remain, and it operates via the debt repayment burden
of the exogenous date-0 debt pc0 bc0 . This can be seen in condition (2.24) because for t = 0 there is no
matching term E−1 [λ0 ] to cancel the two terms with pc′ (t)btc . Hence, the planner has the incentive to
increase pc0 to reduce the debt repayment burden at t = 0.
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this tax in place, the intermediaries’ no-arbitrage condition becomes:

qtc

 c 
q∗ Et pt+1
=
.
(1 + θt )
ptc

(2.26)

The revenue generated by this tax is rebated to intermediaries as a lump-sum transfer, which
can also be a lump-sum tax if θt < 0. Notice that the tax is known at the moment of issuing
bonds, and is paid with the bond repayment.
The tax on domestic debt is denoted τt . If this tax is used, the budget constraint of the
representative agent becomes:
c
qtc ptc bt+1
+ ctT + ptN ctN = ptc btc (1 + τt ) + ytT + ptN yN + Tt ,

(2.27)

where Tt is a lump-sum rebate of the revenue generated by this tax (or a lump-sum tax if

τt < 0).
If both taxes are used, the agent’s Euler equation for bonds can be expressed as:


T
+ µtCE .
uT (t) = (1 + τt )(1 + θt )β Et uT (t + 1)R̃t+1

(2.28)

This condition implies that, unless decentralizing socially optimal allocations requires different taxes on capital inflows and domestic debt for reasons other than distorting the private
agents’ intertemporal decision margin, taxing one is equivalent to taxing the other. What
matters is the combined effective tax rate (1 + τte f ) ≡ (1 + τt )(1 + θt ), and the particular values of each tax are undetermined. One such instance is the standard SS model, in
which intermediation is inessential and the only inefficiency affecting the unregulated decentralized equilibrium is the macroprudential externality leading agents to underestimate
the social marginal cost of borrowing. In this case, the optimal policy can be implemented
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equally with only domestic debt taxes, only capital controls or any mix of both that yields
the same τt .41 Thus, the standard SS model of Sudden Stops does not provide a justificaef

tion for capital controls as a policy to discriminate domestic v. foreign credit flows.
The presence of the intermediation externality in the SSLD model is not sufficient to
break the above equivalence result. The optimal policy under commitment still requires
only an effective debt tax, and any combination of τt and θt that yields the same τt yields a
ef

competitive equilibrium with identical allocations as those that solve the planner’s problem.
Hence, optimal policy under commitment in the SSLD model shares the property of the SS
model that it does not justify the use of capital controls.
Since allocations and prices are independent of µt when the constraint binds at t, the
relevant use of the tax is when µt = 0. In this case, the optimal tax is the one that equalizes the social and private marginal costs of borrowing given by the right-hand-sides of
conditions (2.22) and (2.25):

τte f

=

Et



 T

Ψ(t + 1)
uT (t + 1) + µt+1 κ yN pN′ (t + 1) R̃t+1
 T

− 1.
Et R̃t+1
uT (t + 1)

(2.29)

The numerator of this expression includes terms that correspond to the macroprudential and
intermediation externalities. Since the intermediation externality can yield social marginal
costs of borrowing higher or lower than their private counterparts, in principle the tax could
be negative (i.e. a subsidy). In addition, unlike the optimal taxes of the SS model, in the
SSLD model the taxes are used at date t even if the collateral constraint has zero probability
of becoming binding at t + 1, as long as Ψ(t + 1) 6= 1. Hence, it is not only a “macroprudential” tax, but a broader financial policy aimed at tackling the intermediation externality.
41. As explained earlier, intermediation in the SS setup can be interpreted as frictionless domestic banks that
borrow and lend in tradables units, or as the nonfinancial private sector borrowing directly from abroad.
Either way, the optimal policy needs to tackle only the inefficiency driving a wedge between the social
and private marginal costs of domestic borrowing, and hence domestic debt taxes and capital controls are
equivalent.
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Moreover, this optimal tax policy inherits the time-inconsistency of the social planner’s
problem, and hence it lacks credibility.42
One important caveat of the above equivalence result is that it holds in part because of
the stylized formulation of financial intermediation. If issuing domestic loans has a variable
cost, for instance, the marginal cost of issuing domestic bonds would be subtracted from
the right-hand-side of (2.26) and this would imply that setting θt at a given rate results in a
larger increase in effective borrowing costs that setting τt at the same rate. Hence, extending
the model to introduce realistic frictions in financial intermediation may not only introduce
non-neutral balance sheet effects on banks as the real exchange rate moves, but may also
provide a justification for capital controls.
If we switch to the standard SS model by imposing on the above optimal tax result
the assumption that debt is issued in units of tradables, the expression reduces to τt =
Et [µt+1 κ yN pN′ (t+1)]
, which is the optimal debt tax of the standard SS model (e.g. Bianchi
Et [u (t+1)]
ef

T

(2011), Bianchi et al. (2016)). The optimal tax of the SSLD model also preserves the
result from the standard SS model that the value of the tax is indeterminate when µt >
0, because as explained above the planner’s allocations are independent of µt when the
collateral constraint binds. Therefore, any debt tax consistent with the collateral constraint
being binding in the decentralized equilibrium with debt taxes can support the planner’s
allocations when µt > 0. In quantitative applications, the convention in the literature is to
determine if a zero tax is consistent with this outcome, and if so the tax is assumed to be
zero when the constraint binds.

42. See Mendoza and Rojas (2017) for an analysis of optimal time-consistent policy for a conditionallyefficient regulator that takes as given the pricing function of private debt of the unregulated competitive
equilibrium. In this case, the equivalence breaks. Capital controls support the debt pricing function,
effectively implementing a policy that targets the expected rate of real appreciation, and domestic debt
taxes are set as needed to support the optimal τte f given the optimal θt .
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2.3.2 Quantitative Evaluation of Simple Rules for Debt Taxes & Capital Controls
The optimal financial policy under commitment has two shortcomings. First, it lacks credibility because of time inconsistency. Second, the optimal effective debt tax that would
implement it would follow a non-linear schedule with complex variations over time and
across states of nature, as dictated by the various terms in the optimal tax schedule defined in (2.29). In light of these shortcomings, we explore the effectiveness of a simpler
policy strategy that consists of time-invariant taxes on domestic debt and capital inflows.
In particular, we conduct a quantitative analysis of the extent to which this strategy can
reduce the magnitude and severity of Sudden Stops and increase social welfare relative to
the unregulated competitive equilibrium of the SSLD economy.
To conduct this analysis, we calibrate a stochastic version of the model and solve it
numerically for the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Then we solve for competitive
equilibria under different time-invariant values of τ and θ , and implement an algorithm
that searches for the welfare-maximizing pair of these constant taxes.43 We use a baseline
calibration with most parameters set at the same values as in the perfect foresight analysis
of Section 2.2.2. The only modifications are that we add the calibration of the stochastic
process of the tradables endowment, for which we adopt again the one proposed by Bianchi
(2011), and we reset the value of R∗ also to match Bianchi’s (R∗ = 1.04). The stochastic model requires β R∗ < 1 to have a well-defined stochastic steady state, because with

β R∗ = 1 agents accumulate an infinitely large stock of precautionary savings. The Markov
process for yT is constructed to approximate Bianchi’s estimated AR(1) time-series process
for the cyclical component of tradables GDP in Argentina, for which he obtained an autocorrelation coefficient ρyT = 0.54 and a standard deviation σyT = 0.059. We then used the
43. We solve the competitive equilibrium with and without taxes using the same time-iteration algorithm with
fixed grids as in Mendoza and Rojas (2017).
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quadrature method proposed by Tauchen and Hussey (1991) to construct a Markov chain
with 9 realizations centered around E[yT ] = 1. We keep the value of κ = 0.29, which is
the same we used to generate Sudden Stops in the perfect foresight experiments. This κ
value also yields a frequency of Sudden Stops in the SSLD model that is close to empirical
estimates (3.83 percent v. 3.32. percent in emerging markets data as reported in Mendoza
(2010)), and lower than in Bianchi’s SS model (5.5 percent).
When solving for competitive equilibria with constant taxes, we assume that the revenue
(cost) generated by positive (negative) values of θ is rebated (charged) to private agents as
part of their lump-sum transfers (taxes) Tt . We do this because, if they are passed on to intermediaries, the frictionless formulation of financial intermediation that we adopted renders
a cut in θ equivalent to parametric increases in q∗ , and hence subsidizing capital inflows is
equivalent to lowering the world interest rate arbitrarily, making very large subsidies that
can be painlessly paid for optimal.44
Under the above assumption, transfers to private agents are given by Tt = −τ ptc btc −
c , which together with the agents’ budget constraint (2.27) and the pricing condiθ qtc ptc bt+1

tion (2.26) yields the same resource constraint for tradables as in the equilibrium without
taxes (2.12), thus removing the income effects induced by τ and θ . In the equilibrium conditions that result, the two taxes appear as before in the Euler equation for bonds forming
the wedge that defines τ e f , but now θ also appears in the collateral constraint as a term
that contributes to make the constraint less tight. This is so because a higher θ moves borrowed resources further away from their constrained maximum, since it reduces qtc ptc (see
c
c
for bt+1
< 0. This effect can also be interpreted as if
eq. (2.26)), which increases qtc ptc bt+1

44. If intermediaries pay the lump-sum taxes to finance these subsidies, the taxes cause a harmless fall in
dividends, because there is no limit on bank liability and no constraint requiring bank dividends to be
positive. Lowering θ so as to approach -1 would then be optimal, because while the subsidy-adjusted
value of collateral (−(1 + θ )κ (ytT + ptN ȳN )) allows only for an infinitesimally small amount of debt, the
c )/(1 + θ ))bc ) grows
amount of resources in units of tradables that this debt generates (−(q∗ Et (pt+1
t+1
infinitely large.
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θ effectively increases the fraction of income pledgeable as collateral, since the collateral
c )bc ≥ −κ (1 + θ )(yT + pN ȳN ).
constraint can be re-written as q∗ Et (pt+1
t
t
t+1

If follows from the above arguments that, if we remove the collateral constraint, capital
controls and domestic debt taxes levied on an otherwise competitive economy are again
equivalent. Only τ e f matters, and decomposing it into τ and θ is irrelevant. If the collateral constraint is present and is occasionally binding (and under the assumption that the
budgetary impact of the capital controls is allocated to private agents instead of banks), the
equivalence breaks because θ has an effect separate from τ when the constraint binds: It
increases (reduces) borrowing capacity as θ rises (falls). Hence, the regulator now has an
instrument that can alter allocations when the constraint binds. If using it can increase social welfare, this can justify using capital controls as a policy specifically aimed at targeting
capital inflows.
Two important caveats about this result: First, it does not necessarily follow that a
policy of setting θ high enough for the constraint never to bind while keeping τ e f at zero
is the best policy. This is because the intermediation externality is present even when the
constraint does not bind, and this can make a competitive equilibrium with some degree of
credit frictions more desirable than one without credit constraints (i.e. welfare in an SSLD
economy where the constraint never binds is not necessarily higher than one where it can
bind, while in the SS model this is always the case). Second, the above result does not alter
the result that the equivalence between capital controls and domestic debt taxes holds for
implementing the social planner’s equilibrium under commitment, because the planner has
no incentive to act when the constraint binds, since it cannot alter allocations.45
In the quantitative experiments we discuss next, τ and θ take possible values from
45. Intuitively, the planner acting under commitment is constrained-efficient in terms of being subject to the
collateral constraint and the pricing conditions of goods and asset markets, and the latter in particular
means the planner is committed not to distort the intermediaries no-arbitrage condition, which the ad-hoc
constant θ distorts.
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discrete grids. We solve the tax-distorted competitive equilibrium of the SSLD model
for each available pair (τ , θ ) and search for the pair that yields the largest welfare gains
relative to the unregulated competitive equilibrium. These welfare gains are computed
as compensating variations in consumption constant across dates and states of nature that
equate expected lifetime utility in the competitive equilibrium with taxes with that in the
unregulated competitive equilibrium.
Figure 2.6 shows three plots that illustrate the welfare effects of fixed taxes on domestic
debt and capital flows. Panel (a) shows the welfare effects of varying τ in the [0,0.06]
interval for θ = [−0.02, −0.01, 0.005, 0.01, 0.02] (where 0.005 is the value that maximizes
welfare with respect to θ ). Panel (b) shows the welfare effects of varying θ in the [0.03,0.06] interval for τ = [0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04] (where 0.02 is the value that maximizes
welfare with respect to τ ). Panel (c) uses the same data of Panel (a), but plotted as a function
of the value of τ e f corresponding to each (τ , θ ) pair.
To understand the intuition behind these plots, keep in mind that without policy intervention the economy is affected by the macroprudential and intermediation externalities. Constant taxes can in principle weaken these externalities, but nothing guarantees
a welfare-increasing outcome for arbitrary (τ , θ ) pairs. Whether this is the case or not
depends on the extent to which the distortions introduced by these taxes tackle the externalities v. the costs of these distortions themselves.
The distortions that the constant taxes introduce are determined by the following effects.
First, there are the two distortions evident from the optimality conditions mentioned earlier:
1) both higher τ or higher θ increase the effective real interest rate in the Euler equation
for bonds, thus increasing the marginal cost of borrowing; 2) higher θ increases borrowing
capacity by increasing the effective fraction of income pledgeable as collateral. There are
also two precautionary-savings
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Effects of Constant Taxes
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effects that are dynamic implications of the first two effects: 3) the interest-rate effect
of higher θ or higher τ strengthens precautionary savings incentives; and 4) the collateral
effect of higher θ reduces the need for precautionary savings. Finally, there is also a Sudden
Stops effect: 5) as a result of the previous effects, changes in τ and/or θ affect the frequency
and magnitude of financial crises, and these effects are non-monotonic (e.g if θ is so high
that the constraint never binds, or is set at θ = −1 so that no debt is allowed, the Fisherian
deflation mechanism disappears).
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When considering precautionary savings effects, it is worth recalling that the typical
stationary asset demand curve of incomplete-markets models, which plots average bond
holdings at different interest rates, is generally concave with a vertical asymptote at an adhoc debt limit and an horizontal asymptote where the interest rate equals the rate of time
preference (see Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)). This has two important implications for
the effects of θ and τ . First, because of the concavity, changes of equal size in θ or τ
have much stronger effects on the average debt position around a high interest rate than
a low one. Second, there is an asymmetry between the two instruments in how they alter
the stationary debt position: changing τ or θ implies similar movements along the asset
demand curve, but changing θ also alters credit limits and thus shifts the asset demand
curve.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 shows that for τ < 0.02 welfare rises with τ and is about the
same across the five values of θ . In this region, a higher debt tax is beneficial because,
via the effects mentioned above, it reduces the adverse effects of the macroprudential and
intermediation externalities. The separate effect of θ on borrowing capacity does not make
much difference, because although the lower values of θ reduce borrowing capacity, the
higher debt taxes are already aiming to reduce debt in the economy. In contrast, as τ increases above 0.02, welfare starts to decline for each value of θ , as now taxing debt has
a rapidly growing distortionary effect on borrowing decisions that exceeds the benefits of
weakening the externalities. Moreover, welfare is much lower for higher θ , because higher

θ implies higher τ e f for the same τ , so the distortion on the borrowing decisions is larger.
In addition, higher θ makes the distortion on the marginal cost of borrowing more painful,
because it increases borrowing capacity which weakens incentives for precautionary savings (i.e. strengthens the desire to borrow).
For each curve corresponding to a given value of θ in Panel (a), there is a range of
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values of τ for which welfare is nearly independent of τ . This is an implication of the
shape of the welfare curves in Panel (b), which show that, for a given value of τ , there is
always a threshold value of θ below which welfare is only marginally increasing in θ . In
this region, the interest rate and borrowing capacity effects of θ push against each other,
with low values of θ reducing the marginal cost of borrowing and precautionary savings
because of the former, but also reducing borrowing capacity and increasing precautionary
savings because of the latter. The net result is that welfare rises only slightly with θ . On
the other hand, for θ higher than the threshold value, welfare begins to fall sharply as θ
rises, because now the marginal cost of borrowing is rising too much relative to the costs
of the externalities, and the increased borrowing capacity is irrelevant. Note also that for a
given θ in this region, welfare is sharply lower at higher τ , because this implies higher τ e f
and hence a stronger distortionary effect of debt taxes.
Panel (c) of Figure 2.6 illustrates three important results of the regime with constant
taxes. First, there is a region of tax pairs for which debt taxes and capital controls are
equivalent, and hence only the effective debt tax matters. In particular, when the τ , θ
values yield τ e f ≥ 0.038, a given τ e f yields the same welfare regardless of the value of θ .
This is because at sufficiently high τ e f incentives to borrow are weakened enough to make
the effect of θ on borrowing capacity irrelevant, and as explained earlier, in the absence of
this mechanism the two instruments are equivalent. But for τ e f < 0.038 the equivalence
breaks. For a given τ e f in this region, welfare is lower at higher values of θ . This is a key
result, because it shows that when the two instruments are not equivalent, it is preferable to
generate a given τ e f with a mix that uses (weakly) lower capital controls, because in this
region a higher borrowing capacity with a higher θ makes taxing debt more costly. Second,
as in Panel (a), for each value of θ there is an interval of values of τ e f that generates
roughly similar welfare effects and this interval is wider for lower θ , which is again due to
the flat region of welfare effects identified in Panel (b). This result is important because it
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shows that, if the choice is only over constant taxes and θ is set relatively low, regulators
have more “margin of error” for setting τ without reducing welfare sharply. Third, it is
easy for constant taxes to produce outcomes that reduce welfare relative to the unregulated
competitive equilibrium, by as much as as 0.45% for τ e f = 0.09. Any (τ , θ ) pair that
yields a value of τ e f above 0.045 is worst than leaving the economy unregulated and fully
exposed to Sudden Stops, and this is true for all the values of θ . Considering in addition
that, as noted below, even the welfare-maximizing constant taxes yield small welfare gains
and modest declines in the frequency and severity of Sudden Stops, this result highlights
the importance of careful quantitative evaluation of macro-oriented financial regulation.
The welfare-maximizing pair of tax rates is τ ∗ = 0.02 and θ ∗ = 0.005, which implies

τ ∗e f = 0.025 and yields a welfare gain of only 0.1 percent.46 Table 2.2 sheds light on
the effectiveness of this policy for reducing the magnitude and frequency of Sudden Stops
by comparing key moments of the unregulated competitive equilibrium v. the equilibrium
with the welfare-maximizing pair of taxes. The long-run averages of consumption and
the debt ratio are about the same, the latter just a notch smaller with the constant taxes.
Since mean consumption is about the same, we can infer that the differences in welfare
are largely influenced by differences in how the macroprudential and intermediation externalities affect regular business cycles, the frequency and magnitude of Sudden Stops, and
the frequency with which the collateral constraint binds (even without a Sudden Stop).47
With the constant taxes, the probability of the collateral constraint being binding falls by
over 350 basis points (from 35.4 to 31.8 percent) and the probability of Sudden Stops falls
by roughly 60 basis points (from 3.83 to 3.23 percent), but in fact when Sudden Stops do
happen consumption falls slightly more.

46. This is only 1/5th the size of the gain that Mendoza and Rojas (2017) found for an optimal, time-consistent
policy of time-varying tax rates.
47. As in the literature (see Mendoza (2010)), we define Sudden Stops as states in which the constraint binds
and the current account increases by more than two standard deviations.
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Table 2.2: Effectiveness of Constant Taxes
Long-run Moments1

Average (Pc bc /Y ) %

(1)

(2)

DE

CT

-29.41 -29.07

Welfare Gain2%

n/a

0.10

Prob. of Sudden Stops3%

3.83

3.23

Prob(µt > 0) %

35.38

31.84

Domestic Debt Tax Rate τ %

n/a

2.00

Capital Inflows Tax Rate θ %

n/a

0.50

Average c

0.989

0.989

Average change of c in Sudden Stops %

-4.60

-4.87

1 DE denotes the unregulated decentralized economy and CT the economy with
2

3

constant taxes and capital controls.
Welfare gains are computed as compensating variations in consumption constant
across dates and states that equate welfare in the economy with regulation with
that in the unregulated decentralized equilibrium. The welfare gain W at state
(bc , yT ) is given by (1 + W (bc , yT ))1−σ V DE (bc , yT ) = V i (bc , yT ). The long-run
average is computed using the ergodic distribution of the unregulated economy.
A Sudden Stop is defined as a period in which the constraint binds and the current
account raises by more than two standard deviations in the ergodic distribution
of the decentralized economy.

Examining how the constant taxes affect Sudden Stop dynamics sheds more light on
their effectiveness. To study Sudden Stop dynamics, we follow the same procedure as in
Mendoza and Rojas (2017), which is based in generating a long time-series simulation
of the economies with and without taxes, identifying Sudden Stop events in the simulated
data of the current account, and constructing seven-year event windows centered on the date
when Sudden Stops occur. Figure 2.7 shows Sudden Stop event windows for the model’s
key variables in the unregulated economy and in the economy with the welfare-maximizing
pair of constant taxes.
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This Figure shows that the constant-taxes regime does poorly in terms of macroeconomic performance when Sudden Stops hit (i.e. at t = 0). Aggregate and tradables consumption, as well as the relative price of nontradables and the consumption prince index,
show slightly larger declines with the constant taxes in place. The current account reversal
and the ex-ante and ex-post prices of domestic bonds are about the same with or without
taxes. In contrast, the expected real exchange rate is significantly less volatile, but this is a
straightforward implication of the capital controls and the no-arbitrage condition of intermediaries (taking into account that bond and consumption prices are similar in the regulated
and unregulated economies). The Figure also shows that consumption is less volatile overall with the constant taxes, which suggests that the 0.1 percent welfare gain that these taxes
produce is due to both lower probabilities of Sudden Stops and binding credit constraints
and a smoother consumption process.
Figure 2.7 also illustrates that Sudden Stop episodes in the unregulated economy are
broadly in line with the empirical regularities of Sudden Stops: Large declines in consumption, the price of nontradables and the real exchange rate, and a sizable reversal in the
current account-GDP ratio. Mendoza and Rojas (2017) show that these Sudden Stops are
milder than in the standard SS models but they are actually a closer quantitative match to
the observed features of Sudden Stops in emerging markets.
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Figure 2.7: Sudden Stop Events: Unregulated Economy v. Economy with Constant Taxes
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2.4

Conclusions

We modified the workhorse model of Sudden Stops and macroprudential policy in emerging markets by introducing liability dollarization. Frictionless banks intermediate foreign
liabilities in units of world tradable goods into domestic loans denominated in units of
aggregate consumption, which is a composite good that combines tradables and nontradables. A collateral constraint limits the resources that can be generated by borrowing not to
exceed a fraction of the market value of total income in the same units, so that the equilib-
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rium relative price of nontradables enters as a determinant of borrowing capacity. Liability
dollarization introduces three effects absent from the workhorse model that work through
fluctuations in the real exchange rate: ex-post real exchange rates alter the burden of repaying existing debt, expected real exchange rates alter domestic bond prices and ex-ante real
interest rates, and the negative correlation between marginal utility and real exchange rates
provides a risk-taking incentive by lowering the marginal cost of borrowing.
We provided analytical results and quantitative experiments (based on a widely-used
calibration for Argentina) showing that under perfect foresight only the first of the three
effects operates and two key results follow: Sudden Stops are milder than in standard
SS models and multiplicity of equilibria with Sudden Stops is harder to obtain. In the
SSLD model, unique equilibria are sustained for higher debt-to-income limits and the
range of income levels that support multiplicity is narrower. Quantitatively, multiplicity
in the SSLD model requires particular preference parameters that deviate from typical calibrations, much higher limits in debt-to-income ratios than those used in standard Sudden
Stops models, and even then it is present for significantly narrower income ranges.
We also conducted a normative analysis of the optimal financial policy of a constrainedefficient regulator acting under commitment. The competitive equilibrium is distorted by
two pecuniary externalities: First, the macroprudential externality typical of standard Sudden Stops models, which is present at date t only when the credit constraint is expected
to bind with some probability at t + 1, because the planner internalizes the effects of the
date-t borrowing decision on the size of the t + 1 crash in collateral values. Second, an
intermediation externality induced by the three effects of liability dollarization, which is
present regardless of the credit constraint, because private agents do not internalize the
effects of their borrowing decisions on actual and expected real exchange rates. Optimal
policy tackles both externalities, but is also time-inconsistent: At date t, the planner has
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the incentive to pledge higher consumption for t + 1 to create expectations of real appreciation and reduce interest rates, but ex-post at t + 1 an appreciated real exchange rate is
undesirable because it increases the private agent’s burden of debt repayment. Moreover,
decentralizing this optimal policy does not justify the use of capital controls, because capital controls and domestic debt taxes play equivalent roles. Both are needed only to alter the
marginal cost of borrowing of private agents, regardless of the source of credit. In addition,
the rule governing optimal effective debt taxes is a complex, non-linear rule.
Since the optimal policy is complex and lacks credibility, we examined the potential
for constant tax rates on capital inflows and domestic debt to produce welfare-improving
outcomes relative to the unregulated competitive equilibrium. If the budgetary implications of capital controls are charged to private agents instead of banks, there can be a role
for capital controls because they can alter borrowing capacity, whereas domestic debt taxes
cannot. Quantitatively, the equivalence between capital controls and domestic debt taxes
reappears at relatively high values of effective debt taxes, and for low values of effective
debt taxes, welfare is higher when capital controls are set at lower rates than domestic debt
taxes. The welfare-maximizing constant taxes are in the region where the two instruments
are not equivalent, yielding a 2 percent debt tax v. a 0.5 percent tax on capital inflows.
However, there is only a modest gain in welfare of 0.1 percent, which is largely due to a
reduced frequency of Sudden Stops and binding credit constraints, while macro dynamics
around Sudden Stops do not improve markedly, and in fact consumption and price declines
are slightly larger when a Sudden Stop hits. These results also show that quantitative evaluation of the policy mix of debt taxes and capital controls is critical, because slight variations
can produce regulated environments that leave private agents significantly worse off than
in the unregulated economy.
The importance of liability dollarization in emerging markets highlights the relevance
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of our findings for the analysis of Sudden Stops. From a positive standpoint, we found
quantitatively significant effects of liability dollarization operating via real exchange rate
fluctuations. Moreover, in Mendoza and Rojas (2017) we found that the mechanism making Sudden Stops milder with liability dollarization also makes them more consistent with
the stylized facts of Sudden Stops than in the standard model. From a policy perspective,
we established here that the optimal policy under commitment with or without liability
dollarization does not justify capital controls, only a tax on the rate at which domestic
agents borrow that can be implemented equally by taxing capital inflows or domestic debt.
Our analysis of simple macroprudential policies also fails to make a good case for capital
controls, as the welfare-maximizing policy uses mainly domestic debt taxes. Introducing
liability dollarization is also critical for demonstrating that the optimal policy under commitment is time-inconsistent, and hence lacks credibility, because in the standard model
this issues does not arise. Hence, liability dollarization makes credibility problems that
are pervasive in other key areas of economic policy relevant for macroprudential policy as
well.
An important limitation of our analysis is that it abstracted from modeling frictions in
financial intermediation. We focused only on the effects of liability dollarization on domestic non-financial private agents, which had not been studied before, but in an environment
in which risk-neutral banks are nearly frictionless and yield a simple no-arbitrage condition
for pricing domestic non-state-contingent debt. Further research should follow the earlier
literature on liability dollarization and emerging markets crises to introduce more significant frictions in financial intermediation, and in particular the possibility of bankruptcy
and/or non-neutral bank balance sheet effects as a result of the kind of real-exchange-rate
fluctuations we examined here.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Firm Heterogeneity & the
Transmission of Financial Shocks
During the European Debt Crisis
A.1 Data Appendix
The details of procedure for data cleaning and preparation are presented in this section. I
follow steps similar to those of Gopinath et al. (2017). For data cleaning the steps are:

(i) Drop firm-year observations that have missing information on total assets, operational revenues, sales and employment.
(ii) Drop firm-year observations with missing, 0 or negative values for operational revenues and total assets.
(iii) Drop observations with missing industry information.
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(iv) Drop firms who have negative total assets in any year, and if employment, sales or
tangible fixed assets are negative.
Also, firms from the financial sector and government are dropped from the sample
(NACE codes 65, 66, 67, and 75). Variables used in the analysis are constructed in the
following way:
(i) Age: Reporting year minus year of incorporation plus 1. Observations with negative
values are dropped.
(ii) Liabilities: Total shareholders funds and liabilities minus shareholders funds. Observations with negative values are dropped. Also a consistency check is performed:
observations with liabilities different from the sum of current and non current liabilities are dropped.
(iii) Capital Stock: tangible fixed assets plus intangible fixed assets. Observations with
negative values of intangible fixed assets are dropped, as well as those with zero
tangible fixed assets, with tangible fixed assets that exceed total assets and cases with
negative depreciations.
(iv) Equity: shareholders funds. We drop observations whose ratio of shareholders funds
and total assets are below percentile 0.1.
(v) Leverage: ratio between liabilities and total assets. We drop observations for which
the leverage ratio is below or above the lowest and highest 0.1 percentiles, respectively.
(vi) Size: share of firm’s assets over total assets for a given year.
(vii) Average Effective Interest Rate: Observations with negative values for the ratio
Interest Paid are dropped.
Liabilities
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A.1.1 Additional Specifications
This subsection presents robustness checks regarding the specification of the regression
model presented in section 1.1. We estimate the regression model using a random effects
specification and also using (pooled) OLS, and contrast the results with those of the baseline
fixed effects specification.
Tables A.1 and A.2 present the results of the random effects and OLS specifications.
Unlike in the case of the fixed effects specification, the random effects and OLS specifications allow for country and industry effects (in addition to the same controls as in the
baseline specification).
We see that the effects of government debt on sales, liabilities, and employment and
not substantially different between the fixed effects and random effects specifications, but
there is a difference for the case of assets of the firm (the effect of government debt loses
statistical significance in the random effects specification). When comparing the results
from the OLS specification with the baseline, we see that the results are quite different.
The latter is because of the nature of the underlying assumptions of each specification. The
OLS specification assumes that there is no unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., the firm-specific
characteristics are uncorrelated with the regressors), which is unlikely in a setting like the
one presented in this paper.48
Overall, the results show that the random effects specification, despite not being preferred to the fixed effects specification according to the Hausman test, are not significantly
different from those of the fixed effect model.

48. The F-statistic of the fixed effects specification provides a way of jointly testing if all individual firmspecific effects are 0. The null hypothesis is that firm-specific effects are 0. The associated p-values are
0.000 for all the estimated regressions, suggesting that the fixed effect specification should be preferred
to the pooled OLS one.
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Table A.1: Panel Regression Results: Additional Specifications - Sales, Liabilities, Assets, and Employment
Variable
B
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
B × Q2
B × Q3
B × Q4
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B × Q5
B × Q2 × Sk
B × Q3 × Sk
B × Q4 × Sk
B × Q5 × Sk
B × Sk
Year Effects
Fixed Effects
Controls
Country Effects
Industry Effects
Observations
R2

FE
-0.003
(0.000)
0.327
(0.000)
0.562
(0.000)
0.754
(0.000)
0.864
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.036)
0.002
(0.000)
0.000
(0.058)
-0.000
(0.727)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
3,195,072
0.58

Log(Sales)
RE
-0.002
(0.000)
0.254
(0.000)
0.448
(0.000)
0.674
(0.000)
0.934
(0.000)
0.000
(0.473)
0.000
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.012)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,195,072
0.699

OLS
-0.002
(0.000)
-0.019
(0.044)
0.015
(0.137)
0.129
(0.000)
0.408
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.001
(0.000)
0.002
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.012)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,195,072
0.712

FE
-0.003
(0.000)
0.718
(0.000)
1.250
(0.000)
1.712
(0.000)
2.103
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.054)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
3,308,816
0.736

Log(Liabilities)
RE
-0.001
(0.000)
0.708
(0.000)
1.14
(0.000)
1.547
(0.000)
2.171
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
0.000
(0.336)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,308,816
0.914

OLS
-0.000
(0.000)
0.51
(0.000)
0.791
(0.000)
1.056
(0.000)
1.59
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.033)
-0.000
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,308,816
0.923

FE
-0.001
(0.000)
0.519
(0.000)
0.909
(0.000)
1.237
(0.000)
1.532
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.474)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
3,313,051
0.911

Log(Assets)
RE
0.000
(0.294)
0.596
(0.000)
0.987
(0.000)
1.370
(0.000)
1.914
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,313,051
0.967

OLS
0.000
(0.207)
0.426
(0.000)
0.674
(0.000)
0.921
(0.000)
1.384
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,313,051
0.970

Log(Employment)
FE
RE
OLS
-0.003
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.020)
0.161
0.091
0.064
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.285
0.171
0.121
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.368
0.271
0.206
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.424
0.417
0.352
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.706)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.763)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.367)
(0.007)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.013)
(0.074)
0.000
0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.408)
(0.573)
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.004)
(0.000)
0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.934)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
3,119,977
3,119,977
3,119,977
0.585
0.8816
0.885

Notes: B denotes the gross public debt-to-output ratio, Qi is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the ith quintile of firm size, and Sk is the skewness of the firm
size distribution. Countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Clustered standard errors at the firm level considered, p-values in parentheses.

Table A.2: Panel Regression Results: Additional Specifications - Proxy for Average Effective Interest Rate
Variable
B
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
B × Q2
B × Q3
B × Q4
B × Q5
B × Q2 × Sk
B × Q3 × Sk
B × Q4 × Sk
B × Q5 × Sk
B × Sk
Year Effects
Fixed Effects
Controls
Country Dummies
Industry Dummies
Observations
R2

Average Effective Interest Rate × 100
Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.041)
(0.577)
-0.011
-0.015
-0.017
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.017
-0.022
-0.022
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.022
-0.026
-0.026
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.027
-0.032
-0.031
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.006
0.000
0.000
(0.222)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.027
0.000
0.000
(0.599)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.03
0.000
0.000
(0.972)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.043
0.000
0.000
(0.637)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.007)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
2,852,913
2,852,913
2,852,913
0.001
0.019
0.020

Notes: B denotes the gross public debt-to-output ratio, Qi is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the ith quintile of firm size, and Sk is the skewness of the firm size distribution. Countries include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Clustered standard errors at the firm level considered, p-values in
parentheses.
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A.2 Computational Appendix

A.2.1 Solution Method
The solution method follows Krusell and Smith (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1998). Unlike these articles, where the distribution of wealth is approximated by the average wealth
in the economy, in this paper we assume that the distribution of firms is well approximated
by the cross-sectional variance of capital. The individual states for firms are (z, k, b) and
the aggregate states are (B, σ 2, µ , ε ).
We conjecture log-linear specifications for variance and the marginal utility of the intermediaries’ wealth:
log σ 2′ = ασ + βσ log σ 2 + γσ log(1 + B) + δσ log(1 + µ ) + κσ ε

(A.1)

log(1 + µ ′ ) = αµ + βµ log σ 2 + γµ log(1 + B) + δµ log(1 + µ ) + κµ ε

(A.2)

The steps of the solution algorithm are the following:
1. Start with a guess for the parameters of the forecasting rule given by the vector
Θguess = (ασ , βσ , γσ , δσ , κσ , αµ , βµ , γµ , δµ , κµ )

(A.3)

2. Using the forecasting rules solve the problem of sovereign using its budget constraint.
3. Using the forecasting rules and the policy function of the sovereign (which is obtained from solving the budget constraint), solve the problem of the firm. For this:
(a) Guess a value for the value function Ṽ .

109

(b) Using this guess, construct a default indicator and also the pricing function q̃
for the firm.
(c) Using Ṽ and q̃, solve the problem of the firm using value function iteration. The
pricing function is updated after every maximization step (instead of waiting for
convergence on V ), which increases the speed of the algorithm.49
(d) Using the solution to the firm’s problem V , construct an update for the pricing
function, denote it q. Notice that a default decision can be directly computed
from V , so q can be inferred from it and from aggregate laws of motion. If
||V − Ṽ ||< tol and ||q − q̃||< tol, then proceed to the next step. Otherwise go
back to step (b) and use V as a guess, construct q̃ using this new guess.
4. Simulate an economy with I firms and the sovereign, for T periods. At every period
of the simulation find the value of µ that solves the slackness condition of the intermediaries’ problem. For this start by assuming that the constraint does not bind
(this is, µ = 0). If the firm aggregate demand plus the sovereign demand for debt do
not exceed the level of wealth of the intermediaries’, then set µ = 0 and proceed to
the next period. Otherwise, perform a bisection algorithm to find the value of µ that
makes the slackness condition to hold.
5. Using the completed sequence of simulated variables update forecasting rules and
Find Θnew . If ||Θguess − Θnew ||< tol, stop. Otherwise, go back to step 1 and use
Θ̃ = ϕ Θnew + (1 − ϕ )Θguess as the new guess.
The coefficients obtained are presented in Table A.3:

49. Solutions of the model under this approach and one where the pricing function is updated after convergence of V are the same.
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Table A.3: Regression Results

Coefficient
αi

βi
γi
δi
κi
R2

σ2
-0.245
(0.040)
0.801
(0.022)
-0.037
(0.011)
0.311
(0.752)
0.000
(0.002)
0.967

µ
-0.570
(0.022)
0.243
(0.012)
0.091
(0.006)
-5.629
(0.826)
0.004
(0.001)
0.912

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

A.2.2 Construction of Impulse Response Functions
1. Simulate two economies with the same sequence of cross-sectional idiosyncratic productivity for firms (N firms) until a date tˆ, with government debt fixed at its long run
average.
2. In period tˆ, there is an increase in sovereign debt. Let x0it denote the value of variable
x for firm i in period t in an economy with no aggregate shock, and x1it the equivalent
but in the economy with the aggregate shock. Define the impulse response of firm
i in period t as x̃it =

x1it −x0it
x0it

× 100. The response of the economy will be given by

x̃t = ∑N
i x̃it /N.
3. In order to mitigate potential history dependence, perform this procedure until there
are M sequences of responses. The impulse response function is the average of the
M sequences.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Positive and Normative
Implications of Liability Dollarization
for Sudden Stops Models of
Macroprudential Policy
B.1 Properties of the BBSSLD Curve
The BBSSLD curve determines the value of pN that corresponds to a value of cT such that
both the resource and the collateral constraint hold with equality (see equation (2.13) in the
text). Formally, the BBSSLD curves is given by the following function:
cT − (1 + κ )yT − pc (cT )bc
p (c ) =
κ yN
N

T

We omit time subscripts for simplicity, but notice bc corresponds to the outstanding debt at
the beginning of the period. Given the parametric restrictions on cT , κ , yT , ȳN and bc , the
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fact that pc (cT ) is continuous implies that the BBSSLD curve is continuous.
The horizontal intercept of the BBSSLD curve is found by evaluating the above expression when pN = 0. Using equation (2.3) to determine the consumption price index
when pN = 0, it follows that the intercept is the value of tradables consumption such that
1

cT = (1 + κ )yT + ω η bc .
To obtain the slope of the BBSSLD curve, we take the first derivative of the above expression, which yields

∂ pN
∂ cT

c

=

1− ∂ pT bc
∂c
κ yN

. The sign of the slope depends on the signs of

∂ pc
∂ cT

and bc . Using equation (2.3), it follows that because of the CES structure of preferences,

1
∂ pc
1−ω
T )η η (cT )η −1 > 0. Moreover, since we are interested
=
(1
+
η
)
ω
+
(1
−
ω
)(c
T
ω
∂c
in economies with debt (bc < 0), it follows that

∂ pN
∂ cT

> 0. Hence, the BBSSLD curve is

increasing in cT
To determine whether the BBSSLD curve is concave or convex, we analyze its second
derivative, which is the following:
∂ 2 pc c
b
∂ cT 2
=
−
κ yN
∂ cT 2

∂ 2 pN

The sign of this derivative is the same as the sign of the second derivative of pc with respect
to cT . This derivative can be expressed as:

∂ 2 pc
∂ cT 2



 1 T 2(η −1)
1−ω
1−ω
T η η
T −η
ω + (1 − ω )(c )
(c )
+ (η − 1)(c )
= (1+ η )
ω
ω + (1 − ω )(cT )η

All the terms in the right-hand-side of this expression are positive, except for the last term
in square brackets, which has an ambiguous sign. Hence, the sign of this derivative is
i
h
1−ω
η
−
. We can characterize
determined by the sign of the term ω +(1−ω )(cT )η + (η − 1)(cT )
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the conditions determining the sign of this term by first reducing it to this expression:


1
η −1
+
ω̃ + (cT )η (cT )η



(B.1)

where we used the definition ω̃ ≡ ω /(1 − ω ). Analyzing this expression, it follows that:



1
η −1
T0
+
ω̃ + (cT )η (cT )η

⇔

ηT

ω̃
ω̃ + (cT )η

(B.2)

Notice the expression in the right-hand-side of the last inequality is always a positive fraction, but its magnitude varies with cT , ω and η , which is what makes the direction of the
inequality ambiguous. Still, given that η > −1 from the CES functional form, and that
cT > 0 and 0 < ω < 1, we can establish the following three results:
1. The pc and BBSSLD functions are strictly concave when the elasticity of substitution
betwen tradables and nontradables is greater or equal to 1: If −1 < η ≤ 0 (i.e.
h
i
η −1
1
ω̃
,
and
hence
+
< 0 and thus both pc
1/(1 + η ) ≥ 1) then η < ω̃ +(c
T )η
ω̃ +(cT )η
(cT )η
and BBSSLD are strictly concave, for any positive cT , ω .

2. The pc and BBSSLD functions are strictly convex when the elasticity of substitution betwen tradables and nontradables is less or equal than 1/2: If η ≥ 1 (i.e.
h
i
η −1
ω̃
1
1/(1 + η ) ≤ 1/2) then η > ω̃ +(c
+
> 0 and both pc
T )η , and hence
T
T
η
η
ω̃ +(c )
(c )
and BBSSLD are strictly convex, for any positive cT , ω .

3. The pc and BBSSLD functions are concave (convex) for sufficiently low (high) cT
when the elasticity of substitution is between 1/2 and 1: If 0 < η < 1 (so that 1/2 <
h
i
1/(1 + η ) < 1), the sign of ω̃ +(c1 T )η + (cηT−1
changes from negative to positive as
)η

cT rises. Around cT = 0 we obtain η <

ω̃
ω̃ +(cT )η

= 1 and as cT increases

ω̃
ω̃ +(cT )η

falls. Hence, near cT = 0 the derivatives are negative and the curves are concave. By
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continuity, for sufficiently low cT the curves are concave, and for sufficiently high cT
the curves turn convex.

Bianchi (2011) notes that estimates of the elasticity of substitution in tradables and
nontradables consumption for emerging markets are in the [.4,.83] interval. Hence, most of
this range falls in the region where the third result above applies. Quantitatively, however,
in our baseline calibration for the perfect-foresight experiments taken from Bianchi’s work
(which uses η = 0.205, 1/(1 + η ) = 0.83) and for other exercises using reasonable values
of bc and yT and any 0 < η < 1, we found that BBSSLD is either convex or nearly linear,
except for a slightly concave segment for very low cT . In all of these experiments, the
concavity is visible only for cT < 0.05 compared with a perfect-foresight unconstrained
equilibrium of cT = 0.92 using our baseline calibration, or a Sudden Stop outcome of
cT = 0.83 for a wealth-neutral negative shock of nearly 20 percent from an initial income
of yT = 1. Hence, assuming convex or nearly linear BBSSLD curves when the elasticity of
substitutions is less than unitary is innocuous.
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Céspedes, L., Chang, R., and Velasco, A. (2004). ‘Balance Sheets and Exchange Rate
Policy’. American Economic Review, vol. 94, no. 4, 1183–1193.
Choi, W. and Cook, D. (2004). ‘Liability dollarization and the bank balance sheet channel’.
Journal of International Economics, vol. 64, no. 2, 247–275.

117

Coimbra, N. and Rey, H. (2017). ‘Financial Cycles with Heterogeneous Intermediaries’.
NBER Working Paper No. 23245.
Cooley, T. and Quadrini, V. (2001). ‘Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics’. American
Economic Review, vol. 91, 1286–1310.
Covas, F. and den Hann, W. (2012). ‘The Role of Debt and Equity Finance Over the
Business Cycle’. Economic Journal, vol. 122, 1262–1286.
Dı́az-Alejandro, C. F. (1965). Exchange-rate devaluation in a semi-industrialized country:
the experience of Argentina, 1955-1961. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Eichengreen, B. and Hausmann, R. (1999). ‘Exchange rates and financial fragility’. NBER
Working Paper No. 7418.
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., and Rossi, S. (2014a). ‘Banks, Government Bonds, and Default:
What do the Data Say?’ ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 425/2014.
Gennaioli, N., Martin, A., and Rossi, S. (2014b). ‘Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and
Financial Institutions’. Journal of Finance, vol. 69, 819–866.
Ghosh, A., Kim, J., Mendoza, E., Ostry, J., and Qureshi, M. (2013). ‘Fiscal Fatigue, Fiscal
Space and Debt Sustainability in Advanced Economies’. The Economic Journal, vol.
123, F4–F30.
Gilchrist, S., Sim, J., and Zakrajsek, E. (2014). ‘Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and
Investment Dynamics’. NBER Working Paper No. 20038.
Gomes, J. (2001). ‘Financing Investment’. American Economic Review, vol. 90, 1263–85.
Gopinath, G., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., Karabarbounis, L., and Sanchez-Villegas, C. (2017).
‘Capital Allocation and Productivity in South Europe’. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 132, 1915–1967.
118

Hansen, R. and Torregrosa, P. (1992). ‘Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring’. Journal of Finance, vol. 47, 1537–55.
Hennessy, C. and Whited, T. (2005). ‘Debt Dynamics’. Journal of Finance, vol. 60, 1129–
65.
Hennessy, C. and Whited, T. (2007). ‘How Costly is External Financing? Evidence from a
Structural Estimation’. Journal of Finance, vol. 62, 1705–45.
Hernández, J. and Mendoza, E. (2017). ‘Optimal v. simple financial policy rules in a
production economy with “liability dollarization”’. Ensayos sobre Polı́tica Económica,
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